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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF FAILURES IN THE US BANKING INDUSTRY
Joseph D. Trendowski
Old Dominion University, 2012
Committee: Dr. Anil Nair (Chair), Dr. Barbara Bartkus, Dr. Larry Filer, Dr. Mike
Provance

This dissertation studies failures in the U.S. banking industry following the 2008
financial crisis. The dissertation offers an exhaustive review of the organizational failure
literature, and changes in the banking industry environment over the past century. It takes
three theoretical perspectives - institutional, industrial organization and resource-based
view- to analyze failures in the banking industry.
The review and analysis allows me to trace the roots of recent bank failures to
external (institutional, competitive) and internal (resource structure, strategy, risk)
factors, and propose several hypotheses linking such factors with failures. The
hypotheses are tested using a data-set that included all bank failures in the US from June
30th, 2009 to June 29th, 2010. A second data-set that includes all recent bank failures prior
to the crisis (2000-2007) is analyzed to compare the antecedents of bank failure prior toand during- a financial crisis.
The results show that both internal and external factors contributed to recent bank
failures. This study provides evidence that neither deterministic nor voluntaristic
perspective alone explains corporate failures. The combination of multiple theoretical
lenses from different perspectives provides the best understanding of failures. The
dissertation also discusses theoretical and managerial implications of the study.

iii
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A STUDY OF FAILURES IN THE US BANKING INDUSTRY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Between 2008 and 2010 the United States endured its third highest rate of bank
failures since the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913. As the entire US economy is
dependent on the banking industry , academics, policy makers, politicians and
practitioners have been interested in identifying the causes of these failures (as evidenced
by the large number of articles about them in the popular business press).
This dissertation addresses the following research questions: (a) What external
and internal factors caused banks to fail at such an alarming rate during the financial
crisis?, and (b) How bank failures during a financial crisis differ from bank failures prior
to it? This paper adopts multiple theoretical perspectives to address these question and
the answers or findings contribute to institutional theory, resource-based view theory, and
the broader firm failure literature.

Banking Industry Background
The US banking industry was stable in the decade leading up to the 2008 financial
crisis. After the dot-com bubble1 burst in the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve lowered
the federal funds interest rate to 1% as a counter measure to boost the US economy. From
2002 to 2006, the United States housing market was enjoying continuous expansion2
(Hilsenrath, Ng, & Paletta, 2008). It was during this period that widespread use of

'Bubbles are temporary increases in optimism about future prices (Glaeser, Gyourko & Saiz, 2008).
2002 and 2006, household borrowing grew at an average annual rate of 11%, far outpacing
overall economic growth.

2Between

2
multiple financial innovations led to many banks relying on risky subprime mortgages to
foster growth3.
One such innovation was securitization and trading of mortgages. Securitization
occurs when a non-tradable asset is standardized to become a tradable asset in the market
(Hellwig, 2009). In the traditional model of mortgages, a bank would loan out money
based on the deposits it held. These banks would assume the risk involved with making
such loans. To minimize risk and increase the amount of loans, banks began to pool
mortgages and make them standardized assets by packaging the loans it made and selling
them as investments (Hellwig, 2009)4.
This financial innovation allowed banks to make loans more aggressively which
made it easier for borrowers to get credit. Easier credit and lower interest rates led to
increased demand for housing, which led to higher prices for houses. Consumers realized
that they could take out a large home loan and refinance it at a later date once they had
some equity established. However, these decisions were based on speculation that the
housing market would continue to rise. An increasing number of borrowers took out
adjustable rate mortgages5 (Hellwig, 2009). They would pay a steady interest rate for the
initial period and pay a different interest rate later on based on the current market rate.
Some consumers took out interest only loans where they would only payback the interest,
and not the principal, for the first few years of the loan. These consumers anticipated they
3

A subprime mortgage is categorized as a mortgage offered to a person with a low credit rating: FICO
score below 620.
4 Mortgage-backs securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) were two ways that banks
did this. MBS is a type of Asset-back security (ABS). ABS value is derived from a specific pool of
underlying assets. Small and illiquid assets are pooled together since they are unable to be sold
individually. Pooling the assets into financial instruments allows them to be sold to investors as
investments. CDOs are a type of structured ABS with multiple "tranches"- a group of related securities
offered as part of the same transaction. Tranches were split into different risk classes and sold to investors.
5 Adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) accounted for 6% of the market in 2001 and 26% of the market in 2006
(Hellwig, 2009).
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could refinance the loan in the later years or sell the home at a higher price (Hellwig,
2009). The problem for borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages is that a small increase
in interest rates will substantially increase the mortgage payment on such a large loan6.
Individuals who could barely afford the original payment were unable to absorb, an
increase in price when the grace period ended.
Banks began capitalizing on the subprime market - providing loans to individuals
with a credit score below 620- relatively conservatively. Initially, they would loan out
subprime mortgages at a higher interest rate to compensate for the increased risk-taking.
However, they soon realized that there was a much better payback rate than expected
(Demyanyk & Hemert, 2008). They were earning a higher rate of return on these
subprime mortgages and not encountering a high default rate. As a result, banks were
rushing more subprime mortgages to the market. Lending became more aggressive,
targeting consumers who wouldn't normally qualify for a mortgage.
The subprime mortgage bubble7 was relatively stable until interest rates began to
rise. High interest rates, low average FICO scores, and low house appreciation created a
"perfect storm" (Demyanyk & Hemert, 2008). The system was based on consumer's
ability to receive money inexpensively and purchase housing. When the interest rates
rose, the ability of consumers to purchase a house diminished. Banks suddenly faced a
market with fewer credible borrowers to lend to. Additionally, consumers who already
had a mortgage and planned to refinance were unable to do so due to tighter credit
standards. This led to a dramatic increase in the number of mortgage defaults thus
sExample:

A family took out a $300,000 (ARM) loan in June, 2003 when the average mortgage was 5.43%.
Five years later (2008), this mortgage rate was adjusted based on the market interest rate which was 6.88%.
Overnight, their mortgage payment escalated from $1,690 per month to $1,971 per month; a 17% increase.
7 Exogenous irrational bubbles are temporary increases in optimism about future prices (Glaeser, Gyourko
& Saiz, 2008).
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creating an enormous financial burden on exposed institutions. The government bailed
out large banks by providing capital to restart lending to avoid a greater economic
collapse. Smaller banks, which were not seen as a vital pillar of the US economy, were
left alone to fight for survival.

Research on Corporate Failures
Corporate failure has been studied in a multitude of ways. Concepts such as
organizational decline (Whetten, 1980), organizational mortality (Carroll, 1983),
organizational death (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983), bankruptcy (Sutton &
Callahan, 1987), organizational extinction (Zuniga-Vicente & Vicente-Lorente, 2006),
and organizational exit (Ross & Staw, 1993; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010), have been
used to explain aspects of firm failure.
Literature on failures can be categorized into two dichotomous streams of
research; deterministic and voluntaristic (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). The first stream of
research studied external environmental factors as the primary cause of failures. The
deterministic view is centered on the idea that the industry matters most when it comes to
failure. Firms are seen as being embedded in their environment. These external factors
impact and constrain the firm so significantly that management has little or no control
over the firm's outcome, thus failure is a result of external factors (see Rumelt, 1991;
MaGahan & Porter, 1997).
The second stream of research looks at internal causes of firm failures. Failure is
linked to internal inadequacies in dealing with external threats (Mellahi & Wilkinson,
2004). The strategic choice (Child, 1972) perspective argues that managers are not
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powerless and can ultimately determine whether or not the firm will fail. Managers are
viewed as the principal decision makers of the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and work
within external environment constraints. Decision makers are considered more important
than the external context where the decision is made.
As Wittleoostuijn (1998) points out, one of the shortcomings of failure literature
is that it often takes on either an internal or external approach, even though organizations
don't mechanically react to environmental forces or exercise unrestricted free will
(Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). The divide created by the two dimensional approach has been
sustained by assumptions that both the theoretical and methodological differences are too
insurmountable (Witteloostuijn, 1998). Thus, the two schools have evolved
independently with little synergy, creating significant research and theoretical gaps in our
understanding of organizational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004).
This dissertation will develop an integrated model, encompassing both internal
and external factors, to examine firm failure. The antecedents of failure will be
empirically tested within the context of the US banking system. The US banking system
will provide a distinctive backdrop as it is a highly regulated industry. The regulated
industry is significant because it diminishes managerial discretion.

Strategic Importance of Banking
Banks are strategically important due to the impact they have on the broader
economy; more so than failures of firms in other industries. Part of the issue is a result of
the financial contagion (Allen & Gale, 2000) or domino effect of bank failures. Since
banks are so intertwined financially through lending and borrowing from each other, a

failure of any one bank is more likely to spill over to other banks. Banks are considered
more susceptible to contagion for three reasons (Kaufman, 1996):
1) Banks have low capital-to-assets ratios (high leverage) which provides the bank
with little room for losses;
2) Banks have low cash-to-assets ratios (fractional reserves) which may require the
bank to sell off earning assets to meet deposit obligations;
3) Banks have high demand debt and short-term debt-to-total debt ratios (high
potential for a run) which may require hurried asset sales to pay off running
depositors.
Financial contagion is often more serious in banking than other industries because it:
a) occurs faster; b)spreads more widely within the industry; c) results in a large number
of failures; d) results in large losses to creditors (depositors); and e) spreads beyond the
banking industry to other sectors, the macro economy, and potentially other countries
(Kaufman, 1994). That is why banking, as an industry, is so highly regulated. Banking is
a major public policy concern as governments realize the dangerous ramifications of a
failing financial institution.

Background on Banking Failures
The United States banking system is one of the most stable and highly respected
financial systems in the world. However, prior to 1913, the United States did not have a
central bank. Bank runs would occur, where too many depositors would withdraw their
funds all at once, crippling the bank. Without a central bank, other banking institutions or
wealthy financiers would have to loan money to the bank or it would collapse.
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As a result of early banking crises in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893 and 1907 (Bruner &
Carr, 2007), consumers began to lose faith in the US banking industry. The Federal
Reserve was created in 1913 to dispel fears and return consumer confidence. Since its
establishment, there have only been three large scale bank failures. The noteworthy
periods of bank failures include the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Savings and Loan
Crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, and the current disaster.
The Great Depression caused many depositors to panic and withdraw all of their
funds from commercial banks. Prior to the establishment of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933, bank runs were common as there was no
insurance safeguarding deposits. Consumers ran the risk of losing their entire savings if
their bank were to fail. Under the Banking Act of 1933 (also referred to as the GlassSteagall Act), the FDIC guaranteed deposits of up to $2,500 per account. Within a year,
this was raised to $5,0008. Not only did the act subdue consumer fear of losing
everything, it also tightened regulation regarding how banks were run.
The bank failures of the late 1920s and early 1930s are easily be grouped into
broad geographical groupings and bank types (Stauffer, 1981). More than one-third of all
existing banks failed in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression (Walter, 2005).
Part of that was attributed to the banking industry being overbuilt. In the 1930s, there
were over 30,000 banking institutions operating in the United States. Most of the new
small banks were formed in small towns and rural communities. Many of these banks
were started without adequate financial or managerial resources (Walter, 2005). Once
there was an economic shock, many ill-prepared banks suddenly failed. Most of these
failures were attributed to falling agricultural prices (Temin, 1976) as the difficulties
8

http://www.fdic.gov/anriiversary/about.html

8
suffered by farmers triggered the failures (Walter, 2005). By comparison, the bank
failures of the late 2000s are largely associated with housing price decline rather than
agricultural issues. During this crisis, failure rates were highest in areas with the largest
decline in housing prices9 and largest increase in mortgage delinquency rates (Aubuchon
& Wheelock, 2010). These were the same states that had the largest housing price
increases as well as the largest increases in the number of subprime mortgages.
From the late 1930's through the 1970's, banking markets were stable. This
period incurred very little regulatory and technological change. However, in the 1980s,
significant changes began to alter the market structure and increase competition. As a
result, the number of banks has dramatically decreased as a result of failures, mergers,
and acquisitions.
The banking failures of the 1980s and early 1990s have been attributed to market
forces, regional and sectoral recessions, and excessive risk taking (Hanc, 1997). Similar
to the 1930s, geography played a significant role in determining which banks failed. For
example, over one-third of all bank failures in the 1980s and 1990s occurred in Texas
(Hanc, 1997). The sharp increase of bank failures in the 1980s along with the apparent
vulnerability of banks to sudden shifts in local economic conditions led the federal
government to relax branch banking restrictions (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010).
O'Driscoll (1988) and Kane (1989) pointed to federal deposit insurance for promoting
excessive risk taking during the 1980s. Since depositors are insured against loss, there is
no incentive to monitor bank activities or demand risk premia on deposit interest rates

9

Nationwide, the median house price rose 58% from 2000 to 2006. Subsequently, there was a 15%
decrease in housing prices over the next four years (Table 1). Statistics are computed using the FHFA
Housing Index.
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(Wheelock & Kumbhaker, 1994). Insurance encouraged banks and S&L institutions to
take excessive risk, leading to increased failures.
Considerable regulatory change occurred in the 1990s. The Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branch Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) permitted healthy bank holding
companies to acquire banks in any state. Beginning on June 1, 1997, IBBEA allowed for
interstate mergers between banks, thus ushering a new era of large mega-banks.
In 1999, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) removed the restrictions imposed
on banks by the Glass Steagall Act (1934) and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956).
Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act, the GLBA repealed
longstanding prohibitions on banks, securities firms and insurance companies (Nair &
Trendowski, 2011). Banks are now able to operate all three lines of business under one
entity. By eliminating barriers between insurance, banking, and securities industries, the
organization of the financial services industry underwent extreme change (Yildirim,
Kwag, & Collins, 2006). Between 2000 and 2010, the number of banking institutions has
dropped 30% while total deposits grew 90%. As a result, the average size of an institution
has grown 248% during that period. Table 1 provides statistics on the last 10 years of the
U.S. Banking Industry and Housing Market.

TABLE 1: STATISTICS ON 10 YEAR PEFJOD OF THE US BANKENIG INDUSTRY AND HOUSING MARKET ,u
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%
Growth

Median
House
Price11

%
Growth

Deposits (1,000s)

Deposits/
Institution

Year

Institutions

2010

7,821

-4.7

98,515

-1.1

7,675,620,512

1.5

981,412

6.3

189,830

-2.95

2009

8,185

-3.1

99,550

0.9

7,559,615,705

7.6

923,594

11.0

195,600

-5.15

2008

8,441

-1.9

99,164

1.9

7,025,791,283

4.8

832,341

6.9

206,230

-7.38

2007

8,605

-1.9

97,274

2.7

6,702,052,747

3.9

778,856

5.9

222,670

0.22

2006

8,767

-1.0

94,752

2.9

6,449,863,880

8.7

735,698

9.8

222,190

6.06

2005

8,856

-2.4

92,043

2.5

5,933,762,988

8.6

670,027

11.1

209,490

10.38

2004

9,066

-2.1

89,785

2.2

5,464,782,399

6.5

602,778

8.7

189,790

9.37

2003

9,256

-2.4

87,790

1.4

5,132,110,038

11.4

554,463

14.0

173,520

7.67

2002

9,474

-3.0

86,578

0.6

4,606,091,939

6.5

486,182

9.6

161,150

7.09

2001

9,757

-3.7

86,069

0.7

4,326,207,001

8.1

443,395

12.0

150,480

6.96

2000

10,119

-2.2

85,492

1.4

4,003,744,079

5.8

395,666

10.5

140,690

6.70

********

-29.4

******

15.2

*************

91.7

********

248.0

********

28.6

10 Year
Increase

Branches

%
Growth

%
Growth

%
Growth

Banking statistics include deposits in domestic offices (50 states and DC), Puerto Rico, and U.S. Territories. Banking statistics are as of 6/30 of stated year.
Housing statistics are a four quarter average derived FHFA Housing Price Index
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FIGURE 1 - BANK INDUSTRY CHANGE - NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS AND
TOTAL DEPOSITS; 2000-2010
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As figure 1 indicates, from 2000 to 2010, the number of banking institutions steadily declined from 2000 to
2010 while the total deposits increased from 2000 to 2010.

FIGURE 2 - BANK INDUSTRY CHANGE -AVERAGE SIZE OF INSTITUTION;
2000-2010
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Figure 2 illustrates the consolidation of the US banking industry by showing the average size of an
institution during this timeframe.

Expected Theoretical Contribution
To develop a better understanding of the current bank failures, it is necessary to
understand how external and organizational factors interact to cause failure. In this
dissertation, bank failure is addressed through managerial perspectives rather than
traditional finance literature (see Beaver, 1966; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Sinkey, 1975)
highlighting deterministic and voluntaristic causes. The findings contribute to
institutional theory, industrial organization economics, and resource-based view
perspectives of firm failure literature.

Structure of Manuscript
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. In the second chapter, the
existing literature on organizational failures is divided by research stream and reviewed.
A conceptual model of the antecedents of failure is presented. Next, hypotheses are
developed to empirically test both internal and external antecedents of firm failure within
the US banking industry. In the third chapter, the methodology is presented, with an
explanation of the sample, research design and operationalization of key variables.
Subsequently, a detailed plan of data analysis follows. In the fourth chapter, the empirical
findings of the various research models are presented. Finally, in the fifth chapter, the
results of the analyses are discussed in depth along with limitations of the study and
opportunities for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL
This chapter develops an exhaustive review of the literature on firm failure. The
literature review is divided in several sections. First, various streams of failure literature
are discussed. Next, the theories that adopt an external perspective - industrial
organization economics and institutional theory - are reviewed separately. Following the
review of external theories, an internal perspective- the resource-based view - is
examined. Subsequently, a model of the antecedents of the US Banking failure is
presented using the aforementioned theories. Finally, this chapter concludes with research
hypotheses.

Firm Failure literature
The field of management is filled with an assortment of failure literature. Though
research on failure is abundant, there is a lack of consensus about its antecedents
(Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988; Weitzel & Johnson, 1989). A review of the literature
suggests that there appears to be inconsistent use of the term 'failure' as well. Various
terms such as organizational decline (Whetten, 1980), organizational mortality (Carroll,
1983), organizational death (Freeman et al., 1983), bankruptcy (Sutton & Callahan,
1987), organizational extinction (Zuniga-Vicente & Vicente-Lorente, 2006), and
organizational exit (Ross & Staw, 1993; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010), along with
failure have all been used in previous studies. It should be noted that some of the
aforementioned terms don't all share the same exact meaning or severity. Terms such as
organizational decline, retrenchment, and downsizing are less severe. Even bankruptcy

may be considered different due to variations in the types of bankruptcy. Firms that file
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States are permitted to remain in control of their
business as a debtor in possession while firms declaring Chapter 7 bankruptcy cease
operations and liquidate their assets12.
Bank failure, per FDIC guidelines, has a consistent definition. A bank fails when
"it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others". When a bank failure does
occur, the FDIC acts in two capacities. First, the FDIC pays insurance to the depositors,
up to the insurance limit, as guaranteed by the Banking Act of 1933. Since its inception,
no depositor has ever lost a penny of insured deposits since the FDIC was created.
Secondly, as the "receiver" of the failed bank, the FDIC assumes the task of settling debts
in excess of the insurance limit. This is unique to management literature as most other
failures disappear. In contrast, failed banks often continue on with another financial
institution with assistance from the FDIC. Of the 181 bank failures occurring between
June 30th, 2009 and June 29th, 2010, 175 (96.7%) failures had FDIC financial assistance
to become part of another institution. The remaining 6 (3.3%) bank failures were closed
due to financial difficulty- similar to other corporate failures. In these instances, the FDIC
settled all debts, but no new institution was created. Larger failing banks, such as Bank
of America, are prevented from failure from the federal government. When a bank is
large and interconnected with other institutions, they are bailed out to prevent wide
spread failure. In this case, bank failure differs significantly from other corporate failures
as the largest firms essentially cannot fail.

12

http://www.sec.gov/answers/bankrup.htm
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This dissertation encompasses the literature primarily on organizational exit,
death, mortality and failure as failed banks differ from merged and acquired ones. Table 2
provides a summary of empirical articles that examine firm survival and failure. The
empirical summary reviews nearly 30 years of failure literature beginning in the early
1980s.
The failure literature in the 1980s focused on external causes. It was assumed that
organizations are embedded in their environments and, therefore, external factors have
more explanatory power than firm level factors (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt,
1991). Determinism reflects the power of the environment over the organization
(Bourgeois, 1984). Determinism focuses on adaptation to environmentally constrained
processes where management has few options and little impact on overall firm success
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977). According to Papadakis, Lioukas & Chambers (1998),
strategic decisions and processes reflect "adaptations to opportunities, threats, constraints,
and other characteristics of the environment". Managers are strategically unimportant as
they are secondary to the external forces placed on the firm (Pfeffer, 1977, 1981; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978).
By the 1990s, an increasing number of researchers began to examine internal
reasons for firm failure. These scholars felt that previous literature was overly
deterministic. External approaches ignore what is going on inside the firm. It fails to
answer why firm in the same industry, facing the same industry level constraints, have
different outcomes (Flamholtz & Aksehirli, 2000). The internal perspective provides an
alternative pathway to survival based on the actions of individual organizations. Several
studies demonstrated that performance is determined by strategy more so than industry

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON FIRM FAILURE
Author (s)
Carroll & Delacroix

Year
1982

Data Set
Newspaper industry:
19th Century Argentinean
Press
19th, 20th Century Irish
Press

Findings
Industry maturity and general economic expansion enhance survival
but timing of birth relative to business cycles does not affect
survival.
Organizational mortality rates vary across a wide range of
environmental dimensions including industry age, economic
development and political turbulence.
There exists a major variation in organizational death rates
occurring in the early ages of organizational life.

Carroll

Freeman, Carroll,
Hannan

1983

1983

52 Data Sets:
23 retail firms,
20 manufacturing,
4 craft enterprises,
4 service enterprise,
1 wholesale enterprise
3 populations:

Finding supports liability of newness.

National labor unions

Found a size-dependent, monotonic decline in the risk of mortality.

Semiconductor electronic
manufacturers

Larger firms are assumed to have more resources, better managerial
skills and closer inter-organizational relationships that presumably
enhance the organizations capacity to withstand significant
environmental changes.

Newspaper publishing
companies

Capital intensive manufacturing organizations generally showed
lower death rates than other organizations.

Also found support for liability of newness.

as

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Freeman & Hannan

Year
1983

Carroll

1985

Singh, House, & Tucker

1986

Singh, Tucker, & House

1986

Data Set
Restaurant organizations in
18 California cities.
Sampled 985
establishments.
2,808 American local
newspapers.

All 389 Voluntary social
service organizations
(VSSOs) that came into
existence in metropolitan
Toronto, Canada; 19701980.
All 389 Voluntary social
service organizations
(VSSOs) that came into
existence in metropolitan
Toronto, Canada; 19701980.

Findings
Niche Width Theory - environmental variations affect the life
chances of specialist and generalist organization.

Resource partitioning model showed that specialist organizations
respond differently to concentrated markets from generalist
organizations: as the death rates of generalist go up, those of
specialists go down.
Niche Width Theory - When competition in the generalist market is
high, generalists tend to die and specialists tend to live
Specialists tend to dominate when uncertainty is high because the
cost of generalism is high.
Less concentrated markets can produce symbiosis between
generalists and specialists.
Study examines impact of organizational change.
Some changes are disruptive, some are adaptive and some have no
impact on organizational mortality.
Selection and adaptation are complementary; not contradictory.
External legitimacy significantly reduces organizational death rates.
Internal organizational changes are unrelated to death rate.

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Dunne, Roberts, &
Samuelson

Hambrick & D'Aveni

Carroll & Hannan

Year
1988

1988

1989

Data Set
4 digit SIC Codes:
Manufacturing firms

Findings
Substantial heterogeneity in entry and exit patterns across industry.
Market share of each entering cohort declines as the cohort ages.

300,000- 350,000
manufacturing firms per
firm year; 1963-1982.

Decline is driven by high exit rates that overwhelm the increase in
the average size of surviving cohort members.

57 large bankruptcies.
57 matched survivors.

Weaknesses in failed firms show up relatively early.

5,207 newspapers from
nine populations; both
international and domestic.
Dates ranged from 1800 1975.

Features of the downward spiral include weaknesses in slack and
performance, extreme and indecisive strategic actions, and abrupt
environmental decline.
Density Dependence - the number of organizations is assumed to
be a function of the social processes of legitimization and
competition.
The model of density dependence asserts that founding rates and
mortality rates are a function of the social processes of legitimation
and competition.
At low density, the model predicts that the legitimation process will
dominate and will lead to high organizational founding rates and
low organizational mortality rates.
At high levels of density, competition will dominate, and
consequently founding rates will decline and mortality rates will
rise.
00

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
D'Aveni

Bruderl & Schussler

Year
1989

1990

Data Set
Matched Sample
49 Bankrupt firms
49 Non-Bankrupt firms
Firms were matched by
environment and size.

Findings
Defined organizational decline in a new way: treating decline as a
pattern of decrease over time in a firm's internal resources
measured by an index of internal resource munificence.

Complete set of business
registrations and
deregistrations for Munich
and Bavaria (West
Germany) from January 1,
1980 to March 31, 1989.

Challenged the liability of newness argument theoretically and
empirically with the liability of adolescence perspective.

Results indicate four findings:
(1) Found existence of different patterns of decline.
(2) Patterns of decline are related to time of the consequences of
decline. (3) Consequences of decline include managerial
imbalances, actions concerned with efficiency, centralization
effects, and strategic paralysis. (4)Firms may delay or even avoid
bankruptcy if their environment is sufficiently buoyant (growing)
to support a resource deficient firm.

Liability of adolescence distinguishes between two periods of an
organizational life cycle.
Adolescence phase - death rates are low, following a non
monotonic risk function. New organizations typically possess a
stock of slack resources. The higher the initial endowment, the
longer duration of adolescence.
Post-adolescence phase- monitoring ends and endowments return
to equilibrium and organizations are subject to usual risks of
failure.
o

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Baum & Oliver

Year
1991

Data Set
Child care service
organizations in Toronto,
Canada between 1971 and
1987.

Findings
Institutional relation plays a significant role in reducing the
likelihood of organizational mortality.
Institutional attachments confer a variety of survival advantages on
organizations such as increased stability, social support,
legitimacy, access to resources, and invulnerability to questioning.
Younger organizations benefit more from institutional linkages
than older ones when faced with liability of newness.

Levinthal

1991

Baum & Mezias

1992

Bruderl, Preisendorfer,
& Ziegler

1992

All newspapers founded in
Argentina from 1800-1900
and Ireland from 18001975.
Manhattan Hotel Industry
1898-1990.

1,849 German
entrepreneurs.

Surviving organizations will tend to be organizations successful in
prior periods consequently buffering them from subsequent
selection pressure.
Hotels located in densely populated regions of the distributions of
organizational size, geographic location, and price experienced
significantly higher failure rates.
Organizational characteristics, especially number of employees,
amount of capital invested, and organizational strategies
(particularly businesses aiming at a national market) are the most
important determinants of survival.

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Amburgey, Kelly, &
Barnett

Year
1993

Data Set
1,011 Finnish newspapers
over 193 years.

Findings
Organizational change can be both adaptive and disruptive.
Overtime, the same forces that make organizations inert also make
them more malleable.
Organizational changes have two consequences:
(1)Immediate increase in the hazard of organizational failure.
(2)Immediate increase in the likelihood of additional changes of
the same type.
The immediate effect declines over time in both cases.

Mitchell

1994

Seven America product
markets established between
1950s and 1980s.
415 product market entries
that involved 327 distinct
companies.

Explores the interrelationship of economic, ecological, and
evolutionary explanations of firm survival.
The influences of business sales and age differ systematically by
the type of entrant and type of exit.
The dissolution rate declined greater with sales and age for startup
firms.

Gimeno, Folta, Cooper,
& Woo

1997

1,547 entrepreneurs of new
businesses in the US.

Threshold model - explains why some firms survive while other
firms with equal economic performance do not. Survival is
dependent on a firm's own threshold of performance.
The Threshold is determined by the entrepreneur's human capital
characteristics such as alternative employment opportunities,
psychic income, and cost of switching to other occupations.
Findings suggest that firms with low thresholds may choose to
continue or survive despite comparatively low performance.
K)

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Ranger-Moore

Year
1997

Data Set
New York life insurance
companies; 1813-1985.

Findings
Organizational size affects failure rates non-monotonically. Large
size almost always lowers failure rate.
Finds strong liability of aging in contrast to liability of newness
and adolescence.
Organizational inertia is especially problematic during periods of
environmental turbulence.

Pennings, Lee, &
Witteloostuijn

1998

Dutch accounting firms;
mo-1990
2,081 firms total.

Human and social capital strongly predicted firm dissolution.
Effects depended on their specificity and non-appropriability.
Findings suggest an integration of the resource based view of the
firm and organizational ecology.

Henderson

1999

US personal computer
industry; 1975-1992.
649 firms entered
441 firms failed
3,022 firm years.

Technology strategy has two important influences on aging.
Age dependence varied across strategies.
The joint effects of age and strategy produced long term trade-offs
across difference performance outcomes.
Multiple patterns of age dependence may simultaneously exist
within a single population.

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Agarwal, Sarkar, &
Echambadi

Year
2002

Haveman & Khaire

2004

Data Set
33 product innovations that
span most of the 20th
century.
US Magazine Industry;
1741 to 1861.

Findings
Found impact of time on both survival rates and relationships
previously thought to be universalistic.
Ideology is a strong moderator of the relationship between founder
succession and organizational failure.
Ideology conditions the impact of managerial roles and
organizational affiliations on failure following founder succession.
Failed firms generate externalities that significantly and
substantially reduce industry cost.
On average these benefits exceed the private costs of the entrants.
Thus failure appears to be good for the economy.

Knott & Posen

2005

US Banking Industry;
1984-1997.

Kim & Miner

2007

Geroski, Mata, &
Portugal

2010

Organizations learn from near-failures.
All FDIC-insured
commercial banks chartered
from January 1,1984,
Failure-related experience occurring in the same geographic
through December 31, 1998 market matters more than experience outside of the market.
All 118,070 Portuguese new Economics, organizational ecology and the resourced-based view
of the firm have all been used to examine firm survival.
firm startups from 19831993.
There is no absolute superiority of any of the aforementioned
theoretical perspectives over the others, and there are important
elements in all of them to explain the survival of firms.

Trendowski

2011

181 Bank failures; 20092010.

Bank failures are associated with different internal and external
antecedents during a financial crisis.
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(Brush, Bromiley, & Hendricks, 1999; Flamholtz & Aksehirli, 2000; Mauri & Michaels,
1998) conflicting with earlier studies done by McGahan & Porter (1997) and Rumelt
(1991).
Recently, research has incorporated multiple internal and external perspectives to
get a more complete picture of firm failure (see Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). This
dissertation aims to extend failure research by using multiple theories and viewing failure
from internal and external perspectives.

Failure Debate: Internal or External Causes
One of the prominent debates in firm failure literature is whether external (Baum
& Mezias, 1992; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986) or firm level factors (Brush et al. 1999;
Mauri & Michaels 1998) have more explanatory power. The deterministic viewpoint
argues that when it comes to failure, industry matters more than the firm. It postulates
that failure is caused by external factors that management has little or no control over.
The external viewpoint coincides with the industrial organization (IO) economics (Porter,
1980), institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), systems theory (Anderson, 1999)
and population ecology13 (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) literature.
The IO perspective includes three underlying assumptions (Mellahi & Wilkinson,
2004). First, the IO perspective assumes that the external environment imposes pressures
and constraints on firm strategies which would lead to failure. Secondly, firms operating
in the industry, or niche within, are assumed to pursue the same strategy. Finally, since
organizational decision makers are assumed rational and committed to the firm's best
interest, failure cannot be caused by them alone.
13 This

dissertation does not use the population ecology or systems theory perspectives.

Institutional theory posits that an organization's survival prospects increase as it
gains legitimacy, social support, and approbation from external constituents of its
institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer &
Scott, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988; Powell, 1988; Scott, 1995). The basis for institutional
theory is that organizations take actions that make them more similar (to achieve
legitimacy) and not necessarily more efficient (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Within
institutional theory, legitimacy is a stronger determinant of survival than efficiency.
Within systems theory, industries evolve in a dynamic, path dependent manner
over time as a result of complex interactions (Levy, 1999). The structure of the industry
influences firm behavior, while the firm behavior has the ability to alter the structure of
the industry and the contours of competition (Levy, 1999). Adaptive entities contain an
adaptive inner environment (Simon, 1996). Complex adaptive systems evolve when new
agents or new schemata are introduced (Anderson, 1999). They consist of a large number
of dynamically (usually non-linear) interacting elements (McKelvey, 2004), where
decisions by one actor take into account potential reactions by others, thereby reflecting
interdependence among firms. Failure or success, within systems theory, is the outcome
of complex interactions between an organization and its changing environment (Levy,
1999). Highly ordered systems are too rigid (versus adaptive systems) to successfully
coordinate new behaviors and therefore will likely fail (Schneider & Somers, 2006).
Population ecology postulates that organizational survival is the result of
environmental pressures that differently select adaptive forms for retention in an
organizational population (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Among the various environmental
selection criteria facing organizations, population ecologists have elaborated specifically

on external pressures for legitimacy and the forces of competition and institutionalization
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
The primary weakness of the external viewpoints lies in what is ignored. By
placing all the focus on external factors, little attention has been paid to internal firm
factors. Since most industries have an array of successful and non-successful firms, the
IO perspective, by itself, seems overly deterministic. It fails to provide an alternative
pathway to survival based on the actions of individual organizations. The perspective
omits the possibility that an organization, through rational action, has the ability to
achieve survival.
The internal approach assumes managers control their destiny. Managers are
viewed as the principal decision makers of the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and their
perception of the external environment has a strong effect on how they manage or
mismanage the firm (Mone et al. 1998). The strategic choice (Child, 1972) is emphasized
over the external context of the decision. Failure is linked to internal inadequacies dealing
with external threats. Internal causes of failure may arise from (a) impulsive decisions
that overextend the organizations assets, (b) not responding to change, (c) an executive
who is either too powerful or poorly informed, and (d) unnecessary risk taking (Mellahi
& Wilkinson, 2004). I expand on these external and internal causes of firm failure in
greater detail after a brief discussion of the changes in the banking industry environment.

Banking Industry Environment Changes
Two major regulatory changes in the 1990s have drastically altered the banking
industry's competitive environment. In the past, regulations limiting intrastate banking

protected small and inefficient banks from external competition (Kroszner & Strahan,
1999). The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994,
afforded banks greater ability to operate across state lines. Prior to IBBEA, bank
operations were limited geographically. Neighborhood banks were able to evolve
independently without concern from outside competition. However, once this act was
established, additional competition could come from similar sized banks across state lines
or large national banks from anywhere in the US.
Opponents of deregulation argued that it would lead to a highly concentrated
banking market, where consumers would suffer at the expense of higher bank profits
(Dick, 2008). Banks that were opposed to deregulation and the subsequent branch
banking were the same institutions that were most likely to suffer from it (Kroszner &
Strahan, 1999). Without the protection of geographic barriers, small community banks
would now face an open market of competition. Upon the removal of geographic limiting
barriers, small-inefficient banks immediately lost market share (Yildirim & Mohanty,
2010) as large firms become large because they are efficient (Demsetz, 1973).
Subsequently, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which permitted banks to
operate in multiple lines of business, provided additional advantages to larger banks.
National banks through their vast resource networks and economies of scale are able to
offer features that customers may find useful such as product diversification or service
expertise. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed the separation of investment
banking and commercial banking from the Glass-Steagall Act of 193314. GLBA provided

14 The Glass-Steagall Act, also known as the Banking Act of 1933, was designed to control speculation. It
protected bank depositors from additional risks associated with security transactions by prohibiting
depository institutions from engaging in investment business. Additionally, the GSA created the Federal
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financial holding companies the ability to engage in underwriting and selling insurance
and securities; commercial and merchant banking; investing in and developing real
estate; and other complimentary activities. GLBA also permitted bank holding companies
to own other financial institutions. Previously, the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)
of 195615 prohibited such activity. Table 3 provides major regulatory changes in the US
banking industry during the 1990s.

Institutional Theory
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983) institutional forces make organizations
more similar rather than more heterogeneous. Isomorphism with the institutional
environment serves to enhance the legitimacy of organizations, which results in higher
rates of organizational survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutionalization is the
process by which actions are repeated and given a similar meaning by an individual and
by others (Scott, 1995). DiMaggio & Powell (1983) declared mimetic isomorphism referring to organizations who model themselves after organizations perceived to be more
legitimate in response to uncertainty - as one of the mechanisms through which
isomorphic change occurs.

Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to further protect depositors by insuring their deposits; Up to $5,000
in 1934 and up to $250,000 today. To date, no depositor has lost any FDIC insured funds.
15 Originally,

BHCA required the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approval to form a bank holding
company. It was designed to regulate and control banks that formed holding companies to own both
banking and non-banking business. Bank holding companies were prohibited from acquiring banks in other
states.
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TABLE 3: RECENT REGULATORY CHANGES IN THE US BANKING
INDUSTRY
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
•

Permits adequately capitalized and managed bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state
one year after enactment.

•

Concentration limits apply and CRA evaluations by the Federal Reserve are required before
acquisitions are approved.

•

Beginning June 1, 1997, allows interstate mergers between adequately capitalized and managed
banks, subject to concentration limits, state laws and CRA evaluations.

•

Extends the statute of limitations to permit the FDIC and RTC to revive lawsuits that had expired
under state statutes of limitations.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
•

Repeals Glass Steagall' Act of 1933.

•

Modifies Bank Holding Company Act to allow affiliations between banks and insurance
underwriters.

•

Prohibits state actions that may prevent bank-affiliated firms from selling insurance on an equal
basis with other insurance companies.

•

Law creates new financial holding company authorized to engage in: underwriting and selling
insurance and securities, conduction both commercial and merchant banking, investing in and
developing real estate and other "complementary activities"

•

Amends the Community Reinvestment Act to require that financial holding companies cannot be
formed before their insured depository institutions receive and maintain a satisfactory CRA rating.

•

Requires public disclosure of regulatory relief to small institutions in the shape of reducing the
frequency of their CRA examinations if they have outstanding or satisfactory ratings.

•

Prohibits affiliations and acquisitions between commercial firms and unitary thrift institutions.

•

Significant changes to the Federal Home Loan Banking System. Eases membership requirements
and loosens restrictions on the use of FHLB funds.

•Regulatory changes are listed in the FDIC database.
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Finally, survival under institutional theory depends on the acquisition of cognitive
and socio-political legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Cognitive legitimacy is defined
as the degree to which an organization's activities are taken for granted (Shane & Foo,
1999). Socio-political legitimacy is the "extent to which a new firm conforms to
recognized principles or accepted rules and standards" (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Survival is
enhanced through legitimacy by making it easier for new firms to attain access to
resources (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), draw customers (Wiewel & Hunter, 1985), answer
challenges about competence (Shane & Foo, 1994), face competitive threats (Baum &
Oliver, 1991), and appear to be reliable (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). In addition to
cognitive legitimacy, Scott (1995) discusses normative and regulative legitimacy as
pillars of institutions that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. The
normative pillar is socially enforced, and includes values and norms that are internalized
by society. The regulative pillar is politically enforced. It reflects coercion, monitoring,
enforcement and conformity to rules. Thus, institutional logic suggests that deregulation
created uncertainty that led to enhanced imitation behavior. Moreover, firms that
complied with new regulations and new norms of behavior achieved legitimacy whereas
firms that did not do so failed to attain legitimacy. Table 4 shows institutional theory
development.

TABLE 4: INSTITUTIONAL THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Author (s)
Meyer & Rowan

Year
1977

Journal
American Journal
of Sociology

DiMaggio & Powell

1983

American
Sociological
Review

Key Points
Institutional rules function as rationalized myths that organizations
incorporate to gain legitimacy, maintain stability, acquire resources, and
enhance their survival prospects.
Firms decouple their formal structures from their actual activities, because
myths may be inconsistent with requirements for efficiency.
Power plays an important role by influencing institutional norms; powerful
organizations were seen as being able to construct their organizational
goals, values, and procedures directly into society as institutional norms,
rules, and practices.
Isomorphism is explained is two ways: (1) boundary-spanning linkages
between organizations and the environment were the result of technology
exchange relationships and forced diffusion of institutional norms,
practices, myths, etc. and (2) organizations structurally reflect socially
constructed reality.
Institutional forces make organizations more similar rather than more
heterogeneous. Power is reflected by an organization's ability to 'define' or
'influence' rationalized social myths.
Organizational changes occur because of processes that make organizations
more similar, but not necessarily more efficient. '
Three mechanisms through which isomorphic change occurs:
(1) coercive isomorphism (resulting from formal and informal pressures
exerted on organization by other organizations with whom they are
dependent);
(2) mimetic isomorphism (refers to organizations who model themselves
after organizations perceived to be more legitimate in response to
uncertainty);
(3) normative isomorphism (stems from two forms of professionalization,
formal education and professional networks).

TABLE 4 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Covaleski & Dirsmith

Year
1988

Journal
Administrative
Science Quarterly

Key Points
Institutions are designed to preserve power and permit self-interest seeking.
Behind every institution lies the threat of coercion (not conforming can
bring it out).

DiMaggio

1988

Institutional
patterns and
organizations:
Culture and
environment
(Book chapter)

Institutions are a political process and the relative power of actors
determines them.
New institutions tend to arise in response to an actor's motives to achieve
some self-interested goal.
The success of a given institution often legitimizes not only the institution
itself, but also its members.

North

1990

Institutions,
Institutional
Change and
Economic
Performance
(Book)
The New
Institutionalism in
Organizational
Analysis (Book)

Defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society - "the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction".

DiMaggio & Powell

1991

Haveman

1993

Administrative
Science Quarterly

Institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are the players.

Institutions can create economic benefit through social processes that
benefit the involved actors both directly and indirectly.
The success of the collective action of the institution often depends on the
creation of accepted rules. Actors "discover their preferences".
Organizations will imitate the behavior of successful organization. Firms
within an industry tend to imitate large and profitable organizations. Large
organizations serve as "role models" for other large organizations.

TABLE 4 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Scott

Year
1995

Journal
Institutions and
Organizations
(Book)

Key Points
Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative "pillars" that
provide stability and meaning to social behavior.
The cognitive pillar is constitutive, i.e. is culturally supported and
conceptually correct. It includes symbols, codes, rules that are constitutive
of the nature of reality, experiences, etc.
The normative pillar is socially enforced, and it includes values and norms
that are internalized by society. It follows a normative mechanism to
isomorphism.
The regulative pillar is politically enforced. It reflects coercion,
monitoring, enforcement and conformity to rules. It offers a social realists'
view that individuals respond to, rather than enact, the environment. It
follows a coercive mechanism of isomorphism.

Tolbert & Zucker

1996

Handbook of
Organizational
Studies

Institutions originate through a three stage process:
(1) Habitualization: organizational actors develop new structural
arrangements in response to a specific organizational problem or set of
problems.
(2) Objectification: the formation of some degree of social consensus in the
organization about the value of the given process or structure and the
adoption by organizational members or other organizations based on that
consensus.
(3) Sedimentation: the spread of the given processes or structures across
the full range of relevant actors and by the maintenance of these processes
and structures over time.

TABLE 4 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Haunshild & Miner

Year
1997

Journal
Administrative
Science Quarterly

Key Points
Imitation is more common under conditions of uncertainty.
Presented three models of inter-organizational imitation:
(1) Frequency imitation - copying of common practices
(2) Trait imitation - copying features used by certain firms
(3) Outcome imitation - based on the impact of others
Found support for frequency and trait-based imitation. Outcome imitation
was only supported for very high or very low saliency.

Staw & Epstein

2000

Administrative
Science Quarterly

Conforming to institutionalized rules can improve legitimacy and
admiration for a corporation and its managers.
Companies that followed institutionalized rules were more admired, were
perceived to be more innovative and rated to have higher quality
management. However, these firms did not achieve higher performance.

Campbell

2007

Academy of
Management
Review

Institutional conditions mediate relationship between economic conditions
and corporate behavior. These include: public and private regulation, the
presence of nongovernmental other independent organizations that
monitor corporate behavior, institutionalized norms regarding appropriate
corporate behavior, associative behavior among corporations themselves,
and organized dialogues among corporations and their stakeholders.
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Industrial Organization Economics
10 economics argues that firm performance is primarily a function of the industry
environment in which it competes. Since structure determines conduct, which in turn
determines performance, conduct can be ignored and performance can therefore be
explained by structure (Bain, 1968). Mobility barriers and market positions are viewed as
the critical sources of competitive advantages for superior performance.
Early 10 economics was concerned with the economy-wide performance of a
complex of businesses (Bain, 1956, 1968). Bain took an external approach and used the
industry, or competing group of firms, as the unit of analysis. By the early 1970s research
on strategic groups - groups of firms within the same industry that follow similar
strategies (Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1978) began to emerge. Strategic group membership is
important to firms as it is highly associated with firm performance (Nair & Kotha, 2001).
Porter (1980; 1985) made the most prominent contribution to the field of strategic
management employing IO economics logic. His structural analysis of industries (Porter,
1980) focuses on competition beyond a firm's immediate and existing rivals. Porter's
(1980) Five Forces Model clearly specifies the various aspects of an industry structure,
providing a useful analytic tool to assess an industry's attractiveness and facilitating
competitor analysis. The ability for a firm to gain competitive advantage rests mainly on
how well it positions and differentiates itself in an industry. Table 5 shows industrial
organization economics theory development.

TABLE 5: IO ECONOMICS THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Author (s)
Schumpeter

Year
1942

Journal
Capitalism,
Socialism, and
Democracy

Key Points
Linked wealth creation directly to the process of opportunity discovery and
strategy formulation.
New firms and new resource combinations within established firms are
introduced into an economic system.

Bain

1968

Industrial
Organization

Firm's performance is primarily a function of the industry environment in
which it competes, and because structure determines conduct, which in turn
determines performance, conduct can be ignored and performance can
therefore, be explained by structure.

Demsetz

1973

Journal of Law and
Economics

Monopoly power can be efficient; yielding firm-level advantages
particularly where large technological investments are necessary.
Challenged the traditional economic view that collusion and monopolies
lead to inefficiencies. Challenged some basic beliefs about size, structure,
efficiency and competition.
If increased concentration has come about because of the superior
efficiency of those firms that have become large, then an anti-merger
policy, while it may reduce the ease of colluding, it may also lead to
inefficiencies either through penalizing innovative success or by the shift in
output to smaller, higher cost firms that it brings about.
Larger firms become larger because they are more efficient.
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TABLE 5 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Porter

Year
1980

Journal
Competitive
Strategy

Key Points
Focused on competition beyond a firm's immediate and existing rivals; the Five
Forces Model.
The ability for a firm to gain competitive advantage rests mainly on how well it
positions and differentiates itself in an industry.

Schmalensee

1985

American
Economic Review

Found industry effects accounted for about 20% of the variance in business-unit
returns (and almost 100% of the total variance explained);
Corporate effects did not account for any variance (leaving 80% of total
unexplained variance).

Scherer and Ross

1990

Industrial Market
Structure and
Economic
Performance

Industry concentration leads to collusion and subsequently to greater profits.
Lack of competition brought on by collusive activity will mean higher than normal
prices and thus profits.

TABLE 5 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Porter

Year
1991

Journal
Strategic
Management
Journal

Key Points
Outlines framework for dynamic theory of strategy, which separates the
theoretical framework into the sources of superior performance (the crosssectional problem) and the dynamic process by which competitive
positions are established over time (the longitudinal problem).
Argues that firms sustain competitive advantage because of their capacity
to develop and pursue strategies and actions that continuously adapt,
innovate, and upgrade their competitive position over time.
Exploitation of distinctive competences - firm strategy concerned with
creation and exploitation of competences.

Hoskisson and Hitt

1990

Journal of
Management

With perfect competition, no strategy will allow firms to gain an advantage
over rivals.

Rumelt

1991

Inter-firm heterogeneity within industries explains firm performance much
more than industry membership.

McGahan and Porter

1997

Strategic
Management
Journal
Strategic
Management
Journal

Dean, Brown, &
Bam ford

1998

Strategic
Management
Journal

Industry represents an important factor in affecting firm performance.
Industry effects are more important in accounting for firm performance in
service industry than manufacturing industry.
Industry environment has differential effects on large and small firms.
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Resource-Based View
The resource-based view attempts to explain heterogeneity between firms on the
basis of resources. The theory holds that variance in competitive outcomes stems from
differences in the characteristics in rivals' resources (Barney, 1991) and capabilities
(Miller, 2003). Survival is dependent upon the application of this heterogeneous bundle
of resources. In the resource-based view, the firm's resources (Barney, 1991) and method
of deploying them (Penrose, 1959) are the basis for sustained competitive advantage.
Therefore, firm survival is largely determined by the "extent to which firms develop firmspecific assets that cannot be imitated by competitors and that provide the basis for their
competitive advantage" (Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010).
The resource-based approach focuses on the costly-to-copy attributes of the firm
as a source of competitive advantage and performance. Initial resource-based view
literature was economic in nature. Penrose (1959) viewed organizations as: (a) an
administrative framework that links and coordinates activities of numerous individuals
and groups; and (b) a bundle of productive resources. Therefore firm growth, in RBV, is
limited "by the productive opportunities that exist as a function of the bundle of
productive resources controlled by a firm and by the administrative framework used to
coordinate the use of these resources". In contrast to deterministic viewpoints, Penrose
(1959) elaborated that firms can be fundamentally heterogeneous even if they are in the
same industry.
Heterogeneity (Barney, 1986) is a function of the manner in which firms acquire
and accumulate resources from imperfectly competitive strategic factor markets in order
to pursue the strategies of the firm. Amit and Shoemaker (1993) attribute heterogeneity to

managerial decisions that are characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and conflict.
They argue that firm heterogeneity occurs due to the realization of sustainable rents as a
function of: (a) resource and market imperfections, and (b) the discretionary decisions
made by managers about resource development, and deployment that lead to differences
in the resources and capabilities that the firm controls. Amit and Shoemaker (1993)
conclude that economic rents persist from imperfect and discretionary decisions to
develop and deploy selected resources that are made by boundedly rational managers
facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intra-firm conflict. Due to uncertainty,
complexity, and conflict, firms will employ different strategic assets.
Firm survival within RBV, is largely determined by the extent to which firms
develop firm specific assets that cannot be imitated by competitors, and thus provide
basis for their competitive advantage (Geroski, et al., 2010). These resources can be
anything that is considered a strength or weakness of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Table 6 shows resource-based view theory development.

TABLE 6: RESOURCE BASED VIEW THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Author (s)
Penrose

Year
1959

Journal
Book; Oxford
University Press

Wernerfelt

1984

Strategic
Management
Journal

Key Points
Observed that the bundles of productive resources varied between firms
Firm growth and competitive advantage could be understood (a) as an
administrative framework that links and coordinates the activities of the
firm and (b) by the productive opportunities that exist as a function of the
bundle of productive resources.
Resources are heterogeneous between firms; that is, competing firms
possess different bundles of resources.
Resource is defined as anything that can be thought of as a strength or
weakness of the firm; specifically, tangible and intangible assets which are
tied semi-permanently to the firm.
Strategy must balance the development of new resource with the
exploitation of current resources.

Rumelt

1984

Book Chapter; in
Competitive
Strategic
Management
(Lamb, R.B. 1984)

Defined firms as a bundle of productive resources and suggested that firm
heterogeneity and thus the economic value of these resources will vary,
depending on the context within which they are applied.
Firms are heterogeneous due to their specific resources, and that firms
make different choices based upon their resources.

Barney

1986

Management
Science

Firm heterogeneity is a function of the manner in which firms acquire and
accumulate resources from strategic factor markets (SFMs) which are
imperfectly competitive, in order to pursue the strategies of the firm

Dierickx & Cool

1989

Management
Science

Asset stocks are strategic to the extent that they are non-tradable,
inimitable, and non-substitutable; critical resources are accumulated rather
than acquired in strategic factor markets and that the sustainability of a
firm's asset position is a function of the ease with which assets can be
substituted or imitated.

TABLE 6 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Barney

Year
1991

Journal
Journal of
Management

Key Points
Firm heterogeneity and thus sustained competitive advantage is a function
of firm resources that have the following attributes:
Valuable: resource must have value;
Rareness: refers to the physical or perceived physical rareness of the
resources in the factor markets;
Inimitability: which is the continuation of imperfect factor markets via
information asymmetry such that resources cannot be obtained or recreated
by other firms without a cost disadvantage; and
Non-substitutability: when no strategically equivalent alternatives exist;
that is, where two (or more) valuable firm resources should not be
equivalent when each can be exploited separately to implement the same
strategies.

Castanias & Helfat

1991

Journal of
Management

RBV addresses the incentives problems within agency theory.
The creation and appropriation of rents help align the interests of a firm's
owners and managers. Managers are believed to have inherent incentives to
perform well.

Amit & Schoemaker

1993

Strategic
Management
Journal

Heterogeneity between firms is attributed to managerial decisions that are
characterized by uncertainty, complexity and conflict, such that different
firms will employ different strategic assets.
By definition firms must be doing something specialized or unique to
develop a competitive advantage.

TABLE 6 CONTINUED
Author (s)
Black & Boal

Year
1994

Journal
Strategic
Management
Journal

Key Points
Firm heterogeneity and sustainable competitive advantage is a function of
the way in which firms construct a network of relationships between
resources, i.e., the dynamic bundling of resources.
Resources are made up of factor networks. Inter-factor (internal network)
and inter-resource (external network) relationships are the basis of
sustained competitive advantage.

Miller & Shamsie

1996

Academy of
Management
Journal

The value of the firms resources are a function of the type of resources
(property-based or knowledge-based) that the firm possesses and the level
of environmental dynamism in the environment.

Makadok

2003

Strategic
Management
Journal

Integrates agency theory and behavior decisions theory with RBV.
Argues that sustainable competitive advantage is a function of (1) the
accuracy of the manager's expectations about the future value of the firm's
resources and (2) the severity of agency problems that cause managers'
interests to diverge from that of its shareholders.

Denrell, Fang, & Winter

2003

Strategic
Management
Journal

The sustainability of economic rents over time are potentially a function of
(1) imperfect markets and (2) the degree to which the firm's search
routines are enabled (or constrained) by its existing stock of resources such
that the firm is able to identify opportunities that are not otherwise visible
to its competitors.

Newbert

2007

Strategic
Management
Journal

RBV support varies considerably with the independent variable and
theoretical approach employed.
Extensions of the traditional RBV may be more useful when examining
organizational context as opposed to static resources.

Model of Firm Failure
Based on prior literature and research questions, a model of the antecedents of the
failure is proposed in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3: RESEARCH MODEL.
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Hypotheses Development
This study examines the antecedents of firm failure. Hypotheses are developed to
test both the internal and external factors contributing to firm failure. First, examining
external factors, this study looks at how variations in institutional and macroeconomic
factors may impact a firm's chance of survival. Using institutional theory and industrial
organization economics frameworks, hypotheses are developed and tested. Next, the
focus turns internally towards the firm's operations. Using the resource-based view of the
firm, hypotheses are developed and tested to determine how the application of resources
determines firm failure.

External antecedents
Institutional theory perspective
Within institutional theory, legitimacy is defined as the acceptance of an organization
by its external environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer
& Scott, 1983), and is the primary driver of organizational survival (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). Legitimacy is a social judgment that is ultimately rendered to the organization by
its constituents. Organizations are more likely to survive by obtaining legitimacy from
external constituents of the institutional environment (Baum & Oliver, 1991).
However, only certain actors have the standing within the environment to confer
legitimacy (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Baum & Oliver, 1991).
Government regulators, who have authority over the organization (Baum & Oliver, 1991;
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Meyer & Scott, 1983), are one source of legitimacy. Government
deregulation of branch banking permitted banks to become larger. Larger banks typically
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enjoy an implicit government guarantee that stems from their systemic importance (Boyd
& Runkle, 1993). They also have a greater potential to impact the entire banking system,
and thus are protected.
In this recent bank failure, larger banks were assisted because of their perceived
importance to the banking community. If they were to fail, there would be a greater
likelihood of bank runs as the system itself would lose legitimacy. As a result, AIG, Bank
of America, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GMAC and other large firms received
special government assistance in the form of loans, guarantees, or capital injections to
avoid failure (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010). Legitimacy provided by both the
government and public opinion helped insulate large banks from failure during this
banking crisis.
HI: Larger bank size will be associated with lower failure rates.

In additional to organizational size, organizational age strongly determines
legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). As organizations grow older, they are more likely to
develop stronger exchange relationships with other organizations, become a part of the
power hierarchy, and come to have their actions endorsed by powerful collective actors
(Stinchcombe, 1968). Thus older organizations are likely to be viewed as more legitimate
as they will enjoy increased access to public and official resources thus improving their
survival chances (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). Institutional attachments confer a
variety of survival advantages on organizations such as increased stability, social support,
legitimacy, access to resources, and invulnerability to questioning (Baum & Oliver,
1991). In most instances, nothing legitimates more than longevity (Deephouse, 1996).
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H2: Organizational age will be negatively associated with failure rates.

Regulatory changes and technology improvements altered the competitive
landscape of banking. The banking industry experienced significant change after the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 eliminated barriers between insurance, banking, and
securities industries, thus creating a completely new financial services industry (Yildirim,
Kwag, & Collins, 2006). Concurrently, the internet was becoming a powerful tool for
banking services. Internet banking provided cost savings to banks from having fewer
staff and physical branches as well as scale effects in bank operations (Shi, Shambare, &
Wang, 2008). Internet banking also benefits the customer by providing cost and time
savings, reduced dependency on location, quicker responses to complaints and improved
services quality (Shi, Shambare, & Wang, 2008). Older, more established banks, with a
large number of physical branches face liability of aging (see Ranger-Moore, 1997). The
combined influences of imprinting, inertia, and environmental change render the core
technologies of old organizations obsolete (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Therefore banks
launched after 1999 will have a survival advantage over banks launched pre-deregulation.
H2b: Banks founded after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act will have lower failure rates
than banks founded prior to 1999.

IO perspective
Several environmental factors contribute to determining the firm's expected level
of performance, including the number of firms present and their size (Porter (1987).
Concentration in the banking industry is limited as antitrust enforcement prevents
mergers of non-failed banks that would significantly increase the concentration of local
banking markets (Wheelock, 2011). Concentration in the banking industry is driven by
entry and exit, which is dependent on failures (Perotti & Suarez, 2002). Still, there has
been little change of local banking market concentration, and the number of dominant
banks in them, over the last decade (Wheelock, 2011).
Industry concentration, within industrial organization economics, typically
decreases failure rates. Scherer and Ross (1990) proposed that industry concentration
leads to tacit collusion and subsequently to greater profits. In essence, lack of competition
brought on by collusive activity will mean higher than normal prices and hence higher
profits.
However, the uniqueness of the banking industry is evident by the disagreement
among scholars of industry concentration's impact. Some theoretical arguments suggest
a less concentrated banking sector is more prone to financial crisis (Allen & Gale, 2000).
Advantages of a highly concentrated banking market are two-fold. First, concentrated
banking systems may enhance market power and boost profits (Porter, 1979). As high
profits provide a "buffer" against adverse shocks and increase the charter or franchise
value of the bank, thereby diminishing incentives for bank owners and managers to take
excessive risk, they reduce banking sector fragility. Second, it is easier to monitor
relatively few banks compared to many banks in a segmented system. Consequently,

bank supervision will be more effective and bank fragility will be less pronounced in a
highly concentrated banking system.
Other authors argue that a highly concentrated banking structure increases
banking fragility. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that although market power is
increased in a highly concentrated banking market, the firm's behavior is often ignored
when analyzing these markets. Bank decision making can often change when given the
increased market power. Due to the higher interest rates that banks can charge due to the
increased market power, banks are induced to assume greater risk. Bowman (1980, 1982)
found there was a negative relationship between risk and return such that poor
performance increases risk-taking which further reduces performance (Bowman, 1982;
Bromiley, 1991). Lower concentration, therefore, minimizes bank risk and consequently
bank fragility.
Moreover, the impact of concentration also varies across the geographic location
of banks. In banking, it is problematic to compare rural and urban banking markets as
rural markets are generally more concentrated (Wheelock, 2011). By their very nature,
farming communities are likely to have few options for banking services, and thus higher
industry concentration. In contrast, major urban centers, with a large pool of potential
customers, have more competitors, and generally lower concentration. High industry
concentration in these urban markets indicates a few dominant players that control a
majority of the market. It is in these urban markets that smaller firms are more likely to
suffer from concentration effects and face a great chance of failure.
H3: Higher local industry concentration will increase failure rates in urban
markets.
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While local banking market concentration's impact on bank failure has been
disputed, local market volatility has not. Bank outcomes are strongly influenced by the
robustness of their local economy (Kim & Miner, 2007). In several respects, the
geographic patterns of recent U.S. bank failures has been similar to those episodes in the
past as seen in both the 1930s bank crisis (Temin, 1976) and the 1980s/1990s bank crisis
(Hanc, 1997). Even though most branching restrictions were removed more than a decade
ago, the regional patterns of bank failures indicate that many banks remain vulnerable to
local economic shocks (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010).
Banks limited to one geographical market will severely tie themselves to its fate.
In the early years of the financial crisis, failure rates were higher in states with the largest
declines in personal income and gross state product as well as the largest increases in
unemployment rates. States experiencing the largest declines in housing price and highest
rates of mortgage delinquency were facing the greatest number of bank failures. These
were also the same states that had the largest number of subprime mortgage and greatest
increase in housing prices prior to the crisis. Therefore, bank failures during this
economic crisis are expected to mirror the local economic conditions.
H4: Greater environmental volatility will be associated with higher bank failure
rates in a region.
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Internal Antecedents
The resource-based view (RBV) attempts to explain heterogeneity (performance
differences) between firms on the basis of resources (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984;
Barney, 1991). Economic rents persist from imperfect and discretionary decisions to
develop and deploy selected resources that are made by boundedly rational managers
facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intra-firm conflict (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993).
Due to uncertainty, complexity, and conflict, firms will employ different strategic assets.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted
adequately capitalized and managed bank holding companies to acquire banks in any
state. Successful banks utilized dispersion of banking activities to increase market size,
economies of scale and reduce local market risk (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004).
Since banking markets are imperfectly correlated, the dispersion of bank assets provides
potential diversification benefits (Morgan & Samolyk, 2003). Ultimately, geographic
diversification reduces overall bank risk (Liang & Rhoades, 1988) and consequently their
risk of failure by expanding into multiple markets (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004).
H5: Increased geographic diversification will be associated with lower failure rates

When organizations encounter favorable experiences with risk, they become risk
takers and begin to overestimate their chance of success with risk (March & Shapira,
1992). In banking, competition has traditionally been a source of excessive risk taking
(Matutes & Vives, 2000). Low interest rates and government incentives provided banks
with a low risk/high return opportunity. Economic theory has found a positive
relationship between risk and return, based on the assumption that the greater the risk, the

higher the required return. However, Bowman (1982) found that higher risk also leads to
higher failure rates.
In the early 2000s, real estate prices were growing steadily allowing banks to
gamble on consumers with a low credit score. In the event of default, the bank would be
able to recoup losses by selling the house at the newer appreciated price. Unexpectedly,
these mortgages had a much higher payback rate (Demyanyk & Hemert, 2008)
encouraging banks becoming risk takers. Typically, firms performing above their
aspiration level (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988) tend to assume less risk. However, many
banks didn't perceive the risk until the economic crisis occurred. Managers accept risks
because they do not expect that they will have to bear them (March & Shapira, 1987).
They are insensitive to probabilities of possible outcomes. When the unexpected crisis
occurred, risk-adverse banks were better situated to remain solvent.
H6: Increased risk seeking behavior of banks will be associated with higher failure
rates.

Summary
In summary, a model for the internal and external antecedents of firm failure is
developed in Chapter II. The model tests, from an institutional theory and IO perspective,
how the external environment impacts firm failure. The model also examines, from a
resource-based view perspective, how internal operations of the firm impact firm failure.
Both internal and external perspectives were used to develop seven research hypotheses.
In Chapter III, the methodology will be introduced along with the description of
the research design, data sample being used, and operationalization of the variables. In
addition, the plan for data analysis will be elaborated on.
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TABLE 7: TABLE OF HYPOTHESES
Predicted Relationship
H# Theory

Variables

Institutional
Theory
Institutional
Theory

Larger bank size will be associated with
lower failure rates.
Organizational age will be negatively
associated with failure rates.

H2b Institutional
Theory

Banks founded after the Gramm-LeachBliley Act will have lower failure rates
than banks founded prior to 1999.

Founding Date:
Before/After 1999

H3

IO
Economics

Higher local industry concentration will
increase failure rates in urban markets.

Home market
concentration ratio
Founding Date:
Before/After 1999

H4

IO
Economics

Metropolitan area
unemployment rate

H5

ResourceBased View
ResourceBased View

Greater environmental volatility will be
associated with higher failure rates in a
region.
Increased geographic diversification will
be associated with lower failure rates
Increased risk seeking behavior of banks
will be associated with higher failure
rates.

HI
H2

H6

Nationwide deposits
Chronological age

Percentage of deposits
outside home market
Total risk-based capital
ratio
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, the methodology used for empirical testing of the research model
presented in Chapter II is described. Methodology used in prior failure literature is also
examined and discussed. Subsequently, the research design is introduced with the
detailed description of the sample, variables and their operationalization, as well as the
statistical analyses to be used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter II.
Research Design
A thorough examination of past failure research was conducted to develop the
research design of this study. As previously mentioned, failure research has been
presented in many different ways. Organizational decline (Whetten, 1980), organizational
mortality (Carroll, 1983), organizational death (Freeman et al., 1983), bankruptcy (Sutton
& Callahan, 1987), organizational extinction (Zuniga-Vicente and Vicente-Lorente,
2006), and organizational exit (Ross & Staw, 1993; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010),
have been used to explain firm failure. All of these terms encompass firms that are no
longer in existence. Appendix A16 lists all US bank failures from June 30, 2009 to June
29, 2010. For this study, banks are defined as FDIC-Insured Institutions (Appendix B).

16 Appendix A provides information on failed banks location, closing date, and failure outcome. Some
failed banks were merged into another institution with FDIC assistance while others were closed
completely due to financial difficulty. In either instance, the bank is considered failed per FDIC guidelines.
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Sample
This dissertation focuses on the 181 bank failures17 occurring between June 30,
2009 and June 29, 2010 and the 27 bank failures from 2000 to 2007. The disparity in the
number of bank failure in the two periods makes the comparative analysis interesting.
Figure 4 shows how the problem has exploded over the past 3 years.
FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF BANK FAILURES BY YEAR; 2000-2010

Figure 5 represents bank failures, per month, during this timeframe. From 2000
through 2007, no more than 11 bank failures occurred in any given year. In fact, 2005
and 2006 saw no bank failures all together. By comparison, at least 11 banks failed in 9
of the 12 months during 2010.

17

Voluntary mergers and acquisitions that are unassisted do not count as bank failures (per FDIC
guidelines). When a failure occurs, the FDIC will assist the bank in merging with another institution or shut
it down after paying the depositors. Wheelock (2011; 431) noted that the recent financial crisis and
recession leading to a wave a failures and mergers that contributed to the ongoing consolidation. He
discusses the impact of unassisted mergers and their impact on concentration of local market which is
different than failed banks (assisted). The focus of this study is on failed banks - those who were assisted
by the FDIC. Voluntary mergers and acquisitions are not part of the study. Of the 181 bank failures studied,
175 (96.7%) were merged with assistance into another institution. The remaining six failures (3.3%) were
closed due to financial difficulty.
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FIGURE 5: INCIDENCE OF BANK FAILURES BY MONTH: JULY, 2009- JUNE,
2010
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• FAILURES

During the latter half of 2008, banks started failing at an alarming rate. The
federal government created the TARP18 program, in an attempt to curb the financial
crisis. TARP gave the US Treasury purchasing power of $700 billion to buy up mortgage
backed securities (MBS) from institutions across the country to create liquidity and open
up the money markets. Since TARP was used to prevent bank failure, firms that received
any TARP funds were omitted from all analysis.

Measures
Table 8 provides the names of the variables used in the analysis, the definition of
each variable, the years the variable data was collected, the type of variable it is, and the
rationale behind using it. Categorical, continuous, and dichotomous variables are used.
The research model contains two broad sets of analysis; internal and external antecedents.

18

TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) funds were dispersed to infuse troubled institutions with
liquidity. However, none of the 181 failed firms in sample received any TARP funding. Much of the
allocated TARP funds went to larger diversified financial institutions, such as Bank of America and
Citigroup, leaving smaller institutions to fend for themselves.
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Measures for independent variables, control variables and the dependent variable are
presented.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the unobserved hazard rate for bank failures (Kim &
Miner, 2007). If the bank is no longer in existence and appears on the FDIC list of failed
banks19 it is considered a failed bank for the analysis. However, if the bank remains in
existence until the following period of analysis it is considered "not failed". Banks that
were voluntarily merged or acquired were not part of this analysis. The list of failed
banks was gathered from the FDIC database. All failed banks from June 30, 2009 to June
29, 2010 were analyzed along with a matched pair survivor (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988;
D'Aveni, 1989).

Control Variable
Return on assets (ROA) is a metric showing how effective a company's assets are
at generating revenue. It is a measure of firm performance. In essence, it shows how
many dollars a firm earns per dollar it has. ROA is very useful in comparing profitability
intra industry as the competitors have similar structures. ROA is a common performance
measure used in banking (and other financial institutions) as the majority of assets will
have a carrying value that is close to the actual market value. The banks return on assets
was collected from the FDIC database. Bank performance is used as a control variable.
19

Both Kim & Miner (2007) and DeVaughn & Leary (2010) wrote strategic management papers
concerning bank failures. In both cases, failure was operationalized the same way - using the FDIC
distinction. Following Kim & Miner (2007), "Banks were considered to have failed if they were (1)
liquidated or (2) merged with another bank with FDIC assistance Appendix A provides these distinctions
for the sample. DeVaughn & Leary (2010) referenced the FDIC failed bank list.

TABLE 8: TABLE OF VARIABLES
Variable
Definition
Failure
The bank is no longer in existence.
ROA

Return on Assets

Local Unemployment

Age

Unemployment rate of the home city of
the bank.
Industry concentration of top 4 firms in
local market.
Number of years since founding

Risk

Total risk-based capital ratio.

Size

Total deposits for entire institution
within the US.
Percentage of deposits that are outside
of home market.

Concentration Ratio

Geographic
Diversification

Type of Variable
Dependent;
Dichotomous (1,0)
Control; Continuous

Rationale
FDIC definition is used to stay
consistent.
Variable for bank performance.

Independent;
Continuous
Independent;
Continuous
Independent;
Continuous
Independent;
Continuous
Independent;
Continuous
Independent;
Continuous

Variable for market volatility.
Variable for measuring industry
consolidation.
Variable for organizational longevity.
Variable for risk seeking behavior.
Variable for bank size.
Variable for geographic
diversification.
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External Independent Variables
Local unemployment indicates when the local economy is doing poorly.
Businesses survival is dependent on its customers. When a large segment, or sub
segment, of these customers become unemployed, the bank loses a large income base.
When there is high unemployment, the average consumer is less likely to take out a new
loan or pay back an existing loan. Since banks are reliant on interest from loans, less
money is generated when consumers don't engage the business. Unemployment figures
are collected during the failure as it has a rather immediate impact. Once an individual
loses his or her job, loan repayment will immediately suffer. Unemployment figures (US
Department of Labor) were collected for the metropolitan area that the bank was
headquartered in and did most of their business. The unemployment figure used was the
percentage of unemployed persons in the month that the bank failed. Data on
unemployment was collected from monthly unemployment reports provided by The
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The concentration ratio illustrates the extent of the market control by the largest
firms in the industry. The industry may be comprised of a few large firms or many small
firms. The industry concentration can range from close to 0%, where the largest firms in
the industry have no significant market share, to 100%. Zero percent concentration
assumes perfect competition among competitors. High concentration (80-100%) would
be considered an oligopoly or even a monopoly if only one firm is present. Most markets,
however, fall somewhere in between. The active merging policy for bank failures tends to
increase the level of concentration after a crisis (Perotti and Suarez, 2002). Due to the
restrictive entry policy of banking, failed banks market share is far more likely to be
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absorbed by a large existing competitor rather than a new firm. The concentration
variable was collected using the most recent market data20 prior to failure. The
concentration ratio is calculated by adding the market share for the four largest banks.
This data was collected from FDIC market share reports.

Internal Independent Variables
Total risk based capital ratio (Risk) is defined at the bank's total capital divided by its
risk-based assets. This will show how well the bank manages risk. If the bank holds low
risk assets, such as government bonds, it will have a much higher risk based capital ratio
than if it held primarily personal loans. Since government bonds are considered virtually
riskless, they often have a risk rating of zero. In contrast, a personal loan carries a risk
weight of 100 since there is often no collateral. Banks with high risk-weighted assets are
required to have more capital on hand. Risk data was collected from the FDIC database.
Total risk-based capital ratio: Total Capital
Risk-based assets

Organizational age (chronological age) and size (national deposits) are expected
to impact failure rates in that organizational death rates decrease with age and size
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). There are few relationships in social science as well
established as the negative relationship between age and mortality risk (Thomhill and
Amit, 2003). Increase organizational age allows firms to develop stronger relationships
with other organizations, thus providing survival advantages.

20 Market data is derived from the market share report provided by the FDIC. It provides detailed
information on all competitors located in a particular city or metropolitan area. This data is collected on
June 30th of each year.

The organizational age of a bank was tabulated using the FDIC database.
Chronological age was calculated by using the firm founding date. The age used for the
analysis was the age of the firm on June 30th of that year. The organizational size is
based on the total deposits the bank has nationwide. This data was collected from the
FDIC database.
Geographic diversification opportunities were made available to banks after the
passage of GLBA and IBBEA. As a result, banks were no longer location bound as in the
past. IBBEA permitted banks to operate across state lines. To capture the level of
geographic diversification, the number of deposits outside of the market is divided by the
total number of deposits. A bank that is well diversified geographically will have a lower
percentage of total deposits residing in the home market. Data was collected using the
FDIC database.

Matching process
A central part of the research design was to identify a matched survivor for each
failed back as Hambrick & D'Aveni (1988) had done. The initial step was to collect
information on all 181 banks that failed between June 30th, 2009 and June 29th, 2010 and
the 27 bank failure between 2000 and 2007. Since local banking markets are often limited
in the number of similar banks, the matching sample was expanded to the state level.
Following D'Aveni (1989) firms were matched based on size and environment. As such,
matched survivors were based on home state and total deposits. The same-state was used
to analyze banks that had a similar environment. It would be problematic to analyze a
bank headquartered in New York that operates in Los Angeles because they face different

environmental conditions. The size parameter ensures that functionally different banks
aren't matched. Comparing a large-national bank to a small community bank would
create similar problems as their operations are uniformly different.

Data Analysis
Survival analysis is used to estimate the unobserved hazard rate of bank failure
(Kim & Miner, 2007). This method uses all information provided by right-centered cases,
and avoids biases that logistic regression could display (Allison, 1984). Parametric
estimates of a hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of time on the occurrence
of the events of interest (Kim & Miner, 2007) which is bank failure in this case. The
hazard model controls for each bank's period at risk. It is important to control for the fact
that some banks fail immediately while other fail over time. Static models fail to control
for each firm's period at risk. Unlike static models, hazard models can incorporate
macroeconomic variables that are the same for all firms at a given point in time
(Shumway, 2001). Time, in this study, is length of survival during the period of
excessive bank failures. The clock was started on June 30th, 2007 which is two calendar
years before the sample period. This date was selected because (a) June 30th is the date
when FDIC institutions report their financial data (b) 2007 was the last year with less
than 10 bank failures; and (c) Failures began increasing towards the end of 2008, making
analyzing the entire year problematic. A hazard model (Cox regression) is created using
SPSS, a statistical program, to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter III.
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Summary
In Chapter III, the research design, data sample, and operationalization of
variables were introduced. Dependent, independent, and control variables were described
in detail, and given proper identification. The procedure for testing the hypothesis from
Chapter II is also presented. The following chapter will include the results from the
analysis conducted in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
In this chapter, results of the statistical analyses are presented. Descriptive
statistics, correlations, and hazard model analyses are introduced in accordance with the
hypotheses. Interpretation of the results follows analysis. Lastly, a review of hypotheses
is presented at the end of the chapter to summarize the findings.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented for all bank failures and
matched survivors in Table 9. Though the total number of failed banks in the analysis
was 181 (Appendix A), the number of failed banks with complete data that existed more
than 5 years21 was 125. The data examined for outliers and influence points using
Cook's distance and standardized residuals. Following Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000),
standardized residuals greater than 3.0 or less than -3.0 were omitted from the analysis.
Similarly, cases with Cook's distance greater than 1.0 were also omitted making the total
sample of cases 228. Correlations for all the variables are examined to ensure there is no
multi-co-linearity present. Each dataset was tested for multicolinearity by running
collinearity statistics in SPSS. Mulicollinearity problems exist with a variance inflation
factor (VIF) above 5 (O'Brien, 2007). There are no problems with multicolinearity as all
VIFs were low; all between 1 and 2 with a mean VTF score of 1.476.

21 Banks that operated 5 years or less were omitted from all analysis. Newly chartered banks are typically
protected by regulatory agencies for the first three to five years (DeVaughn & Kim, 2006) limiting their
usefulness in analysis. The same criteria were applied to all datasets.

TABLE 9: CORRELATION MATRIX
ID

Variables

Mean

s.d

1

28,747

263,843

1.000

2

3

4

5

6

1

Size22

2

Age

47.39

47.39

0.038

1.000

3

Concentration

78.87

17.16

-0.146

0.553

1.000

4

Unemployment

7.81

2.759

0.278

-0.151

-0.120

1.000

5

Diversification

31.16

26.80

0.275

-0.037

-0.223

0.053

1.000

6

Risk

11.43

6.25

0.049

0.231

0.109

-0.162

0.047

1.000

7

Performance

-3.93

5.20

0.077

0.032

-0.118

-0.045

0.175

0.392

7

1.000

N = 228 banks; 664 bank years
Bold are significant at p=.05 level

22 Number

is in thousands USD.

a\

66

Hazard Model
To test the antecedents of bank failure during the financial crisis, a hazard model
was used since. The hazard model has several advantages over static models including:
(a) static models fail to control for each firm's period at risk, (b) hazard models
incorporate time-varying covariates, or explanatory variables that change with time, and
(c) hazard models produce more efficient out-of-sample forecasts by utilizing much more
data (Shumway, 2001). A second hazard model was created to examine what caused
recent23 bank failures prior to the crisis. Table 10 displays the results of the two hazard
models.
Fascinatingly, 5 of the 7 independent variables are significant either pre-crisis or
post-crisis, but not both. This would conclude that bank failure is attributed to different
causes during a crisis and non-crisis situation. Prior to the crisis bank size (p<.05) and
market concentration (p<.10) were significant in support of hypotheses 1 and 3.
Organizational size is a key determinant of legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996) and legitimacy
is a primary determinant of survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Interestingly, organizational size had a lesser impact on survival rates during the crisis. It
can be concluded that other, more impactful variables determined those failures. The
same can be said about the concentration of the local market. Prior to the crisis, banks
operating in highly concentrated markets were less likely to fail than those operating in
dispersed markets. Typically, highly concentrated markets face a diminished threat of
new entrants and are in better position to compete (Porter, 1980). Once the financial

23 The

second data set consisted of bank failures between 2000 and 2007. This time period was significant
as it followed the GLBA of 1999.
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TABLE 10: HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES24;
A. BANK FAILURES DURING THE CRISIS
Coefficient
S.E.
Variable Size
Age

0.000
-0.002

0.320

Concentration

0.014

0.010

Unemployment

0.139**

0.052

Diversification

0.001

0.006

Risk

-0.223***

0.039

#Performance

-0.086***

0.028

0.297

N= 228 banks; 664 bank years
Log-likelihood = 399.90
Chi-square = 95.20***
df= 7

B. BANK FAILURES PRIOR TO THE CRISIS
Variable
Coefficient
S.E.
Size

0.000**

Age

-0.002

0.000
0.377

Concentration

-0.032*

0.018

Unemployment

-0.238

0.203

Diversification

0.428

1.210

Risk

-0.061

0.047

#Performance

0.024

0.071

N= 44 banks; 154 bank years
Log-likelihood = 101.56
Chi-square = 9.83*
df= 6
*p<-10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
# control variable

24

Model A displays the results of the Hazard Model performed on the failures and matched pair from June
30th, 2009 and June 29th, 2010. These failures occurred during the banking crisis. Model B displays the
results of the Hazard Model performed on the bank failures and matched pair that occurred between
January 1, 2000 and December 31st2007. These failures occurred before the banking crisis began.
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crisis began, other external forces increased failure rates, thus negating the positive
benefits of high industry concentration.
When the financial crisis began in 2008, the determinants of survival shifted.
During the crisis, unemployment (p<.05) and risk-seeking behavior (p<.001) were
associated with bank failure in support of hypotheses 4 and 6. Given that unemployment
numbers were low prior to 2008, it is expected that a small variance between cities
wouldn't cause a significant increase in bank failure. Unemployment numbers rose to
their highest rates since the Great Depression. Those cities that were hit hardest were
much more likely to see bank failures. Bank risk became a much more severe problem
during the bank crisis. Banks were able to engage in riskier activity without consequence
prior to the banking market decline. During that timeframe, higher risk would often lead
to higher rewards (returns). During the crisis, however, higher risk led to higher failure
rates.
Additionally, there were two age-related discoveries. First, organizational age
(H2) didn't significantly impact failure rates. Traditionally, nothing legitimates more than
longevity (Deephouse, 1996).However, when the regulatory and technology changes
occurred, older institutions faced a completely new financial services industry.
Established banks had to begin new routines and procedures thus eliminating prior
longevity advantages. Alternatively, banks that were founded after 1999 had lower failure
rates25 (p<.085) in support of hypothesis 2b. As these institutions were born into the new

25 H2b

examined if banks founded after deregulation (1999) had lower failure rates than banks founded
prior to it. Since an alternative perspective was used to contradict H2, this analysis was done separately. A
dummy variable was created where 0=founded in 1999 or before; l=founded after 2000. The coefficient
was 0.484 and the standard error was 0.283. It was significant at the p<.10 level. This data is not listed in
Table 10.

financial services industry, they were able to adapt to the rapidly changing environment.
Table 11 displays the overall results of the hypotheses.
To test for causality, variables were lagged 1 year and 2 years respectively to capture
banks at the onset of the crisis and one year prior to it. Risk-seeking behavior was found
to be the only significant variable (p<.05) that influenced the failure rate. This supports
the conclusion that risk-seeking behavior becomes more harmful when there is a crisis.
The risk-seeking behavior didn't have strong negative consequences until the financial
crisis occurred.

TAB]LE 11: SUMMARY OF RESULTS
H# Theory
Predicted Relationship

Result

HI

Institutional
Theory

Larger bank size will be associated with
lower failure rates.

Supported; failures
prior to the bank crisis

H2

Institutional
Theory

Organizational age will be negatively
associated with failure rates.

Not Supported

Banks founded after the Gramm-LeachBliley Act will have lower failure rates
than banks founded prior to 1999.
Higher local industry concentration will
increase failure rates in urban markets.

Supported

H2b Institutional
Theory

Supported; failures
prior to the bank crisis

H3

IO
Economics

H4

IO
Economics

Greater environmental volatility will be
associated with higher failure rates in a
region.

Supported; failures
during the bank crisis

H5

IO
Economics

Increased geographic diversification will
be associated with lower failure rates.

Not supported

H6

ResourceBased View

Increased risk seeking behavior of banks
will be associated with higher failure
rates.

Supported; failures
during the bank crisis
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the dissertation objectives are reviewed and the results of the
empirical analyses from Chapter IV are discussed. Theoretical contributions are
highlighted along with study limitations and opportunities for future research.

Dissertation Objectives
The core of this dissertation encompassed the question, what caused such a high
rate of bank failure. Past bank failures have been examined and their antecedents
explained. Temin (1976) listed falling agricultural prices, resulting from the great
depression, as the trigger to the widespread bank failure of the 1930s. Geographic areas
where local farms were failing in large numbers would be the same areas where the
failing banks would be.
Market forces and sectoral recessions that contributed to the bank failures of the
1930s also contributed to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s.
What differentiated the latter failure was the level of excessive risk taking (Hanc, 1997).
Since the institutions were insured against losses, there was no incentive for them to
monitor bank activities or demand risk premia on deposit interest rates (Wheelock &
Kumbhaker, 1994).
This current financial crisis has largely been attributed to Wall Street (Lewis,
2010). Non-depository financial institutions created products based on risky mortgages
and found ways to package them as seemingly secure investments. The ratings agencies
(Moody's and S&P) gave risky assets gold-plated ratings, opening the door to a huge
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market of CDO buyers (Lewis, 2010). Once the NDFIs had someone to sell the risky
mortgages to, lenders were no longer concerned about repayment. Profit driven, facing
minimized risk, lenders enticed Americans to take out mortgages they couldn't afford.
American consumers gladly accepted these mortgages.
Nevertheless, the financial crisis is only one aspect of the bank failures. This
dissertation examined failure from an institutional theory, industrial organization
economics, and resource-based view perspective. The objective of this dissertation was to
illuminate how external factors, institutional factors, and organizational factors contribute
to bank failure. This was accomplished using strategic management perspectives rather
than relying on traditional finance literature on bank failure (see Beaver, 1966; Meyer
andPifer, 1970; Sinkey, 1975).
This study tested competing perspectives in the context of organizational failure.
Using institutional theory and industrial organizational economics, deterministic
perspectives are discussed as causes of bank failure. Contrarily, using the resource-based
view perspective, the voluntaristic point of view is discussed.

Discussion
Hypothesis 1 tested if bank size attributed to their survivability. As expected,
larger banks were more likely to survive than smaller banks. Liability of smallness
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986) suggests that small banks do not perform as well as large banks
and have higher failure rates because they incur problems raising capital, attracting and
retaining highly skilled workers, and having higher administrative costs.

The average size of banking institutions has growth nearly 250% larger in the
past 10 years. Regulatory changes have produced large conglomerate banks that have
become a one stop shop for financial services. Larger organizations are assumed to have
more resources, better managerial skills and closer interorganizational relationships that
presumably enhance the organizations capacity to withstand significant environmental
changes (Freeman et al., 1983). Large size almost always lowers failure rates (RangerMoore, 1997). However, this was not the case during the financial crisis. The hazard
model found that organizational size didn't significantly influence failure rates during the
financial crisis. Part of that non-finding can be attributed to TARP. The largest failing
banks received assistance, and therefore could not fail. By analyzing failure without the
largest banks, or other outliers, some of the value in bank size was inevitably lost.
Hypothesis 2 tested the relationship between bank age and failure rates. Though
organizational age often leads to higher survival rates, it did not in this study - for either
timeframe. Selection processes typically favor older, more reliable organizations
resulting in a decline in failure rates with age (Stinchcombe, 1965). Deregulation created
opportunities for incumbent firms to introduce new products and enter new geographic
markets. When a firm engages in a new activity26 for the first time, it needs to establish
internal and external norms, new roles for organization members, standard operating
procedures, and new patterns for interacting (Shane & Foo, 1999). As Shane and Foo
(1999) indicate, firms that engage in new activities are more likely to fail as their
members must learn new roles and establish routines and procedures. Older banks that
had achieved legitimacy pre-deregulation had subsequently lost it as the industry
26 Regulatory changes and technology improvements altered the competitive landscape of banking. The
elimination of barriers between insurance, banking, and securities industries has created a completely new
financial services industry (Yildirim, Kwag, & Collins, 2006).

structure changed and consumers required more services. The constant evolution of the
banking industry after the regulatory changes diminished longevity advantages that older
banks had enjoyed.
Hypothesis 2b tested whether banks born after deregulation enjoyed survival
advantages. The results show that younger banks, founded between 2000 and 2005 were
more likely to survive during the financial crisis. Older banks were at a disadvantage
because firms that engage in new activities are more likely to fail as their members must
learn new roles and establish routines and procedures (Shane & Foo, 1999). Newer
institutions didn't have to contend with old routines, and thus enjoyed survival
advantages.
Hypothesis 3 tested the impact local industry concentration had on bank survival.
These results showed that concentration was not significant during the financial crisis,
but was significant prior to it. Higher industry concentration generally leads to greater
profits (Scherer & Ross, 1990) which should lead to increased survival. However, others
argue that a highly concentrated banking structure increases banking fragility (Boyd &
DeNicolo, 2005). The results show agreement to both assertions. First, banking markets
with higher concentration had fewer failures prior to the financial crisis. Given the
banking industry's active merging policy and restrictive entry policy (Suarez & Perotti,
2002) high concentration puts banks in better position to compete. Those operating in
highly concentrated markets, therefore, will be less likely to fail. This relationship
changed, however, once the financial crisis began. As Boyd & DeNicolo (2005) point
out, high industry concentration also increases bank fragility. When the banking industry
is healthy, other deterministic environmental factors are not pushing towards failure.

When the banking industry is in crisis, however, external factors diminish concentration
advantages.
Hypothesis 4 tested the impact that local market volatility had on failure rates. As
expected, the economic downturn increased failure rates in local economies that were
severely impacted. When the local economy is suffering, all businesses in that economy
suffer - including banks - thus increasing failure rates. The reason that local market
volatility was not significant prior the economic crisis was because local economies were
relatively stable across the United States. The variation of economic distress was minimal
between 2000 and 2007. By the time the financial crisis was underway, there was a much
larger disparity between stable and unstable markets. When local economies began to fail
during the financial crisis, bank failures ultimately followed.
Hypothesis 5 tested geographic diversification's relationship to bank
failure. Geographic diversification was not associated with bank failure rates. It has been
discussed how bank outcomes are severely tied to their local economy. Still, small banks
are often not well diversified (Neely & Wheelock, 1997). Even though geographic
diversification reduces overall bank risk (Liang & Rhoades, 1988) and subsequently their
risk of failure by expanding into multiple markets (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004),
many small banks lack the capacity or desire to expand. This study primarily utilized
small to medium sized banks and therefore didn't include large banks that achieved
diversification advantages. It is possible that an entire population of banks, containing
large and small banks alike, would have significant results showing survival advantages
for geographically diversified banks.
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Hypothesis 6 tested risk seeking behavior as a factor of bank failure. As expected,
banks that engage in riskier practices were more likely to fail during the financial crisis.
Michael Lewis (2010), in his book The Big Short, mentions that Wall Street greed was
behind much of the crisis. Subprime mortgages were created in the search for greater
profits. While housing prices were rising, customers of subprime mortgages could be
charged a premium. Since the housing prices were continually rising, the risk of these
mortgages was minimal. Once real estate prices began to plummet, these risks (along
with others) backfired. Banks were stuck with tremendous liabilities. Risk adverse
institutions, that didn't engage heavily in these practices, remained relatively unharmed.

Limitations and future research
' A limitation of this study was that all banks in the United States were not
included. Due to considerations of time and availability, only the data on failed banks,
along with a matched-pair, was collected. This significantly reduced collection time as
data for a few hundred, rather than several thousand banks was used. This may not be
representative of the entire population as there were certainly not an equal number of
failed and non-failed banks. Only about 2% of all banks in the U.S. failed during the
timeframe of the study. Future research could include the entire population of U.S.
banks.
The lack of managerial decision making data was another limitation of this study.
No hypothesis tested risk at the time of the decision making. Furthermore, no primary
data was used to determine the managerial competency of the bank leaders. Only post

hoc analysis of their decisions was used. A future study could collect primary data from
those key decision makers at the banks.
Another limitation was the timeframe. This study captured the first few years of
the bank crisis. As the paper is completed, the recession is still ongoing. At this point and
time, no one is certain when it will end. Similar to other studies done, an analysis of the
bank failure could be done after the situation has passed. Alston et al. (1994) conducted a
study on the Great Depression bank failures 50 years after it had ended. After some time
has passed, it would be interesting to take a look back.

Conclusion
This dissertation tested deterministic and voluntaristic determinants of bank
failure following the financial crisis of 2008. It was found that both internal and external
factors were associated with failure. It was also determined that different factors are
associated with bank failure during a financial crisis compared to a non-crisis situation.
During the financial crisis, risk seeking behavior by banks was associated with bank
failures. In stable economic conditions, risk seeking behavior may lead to higher
profitability. Banks are insured against loses which gives them more latitude to take risks.
However, when the market takes a downturn, the risk seeking backfires and leads to
higher failure rates. As a result, the government is taking steps to reduce risk-seeking
behavior27.

27 The

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 contained "The Volcker
Rule" section which bans most proprietary trading by banks with federally insured deposits. Trades related
to market-making were exempt, provided that they met at least seven standards, or principles. The Volcker
Rule was implemented to limit risk-seeking behavior.

Another finding that was expected was that environmental volatility is associated
with failure rates during an economic crisis. The period before the crisis was stable, so
there were few bank failures. When the local economies began to falter, the banks within
that market began to fail. This was expected because economic distress increases failure
rates in almost every industry, including banking.
This financial crisis was unique because organizational longevity didn't decrease
failure rates but having a founding date after 1999 did. It was determined that banks that
were launched after the deregulation period had lower failure rates. ATM networks and
banking websites leveled the playing field in the early 2000s. New banks that adopted the
high tech model were better suited for the new competitive environment.
The factors associated with failure prior to the financial crisis, but not during, are
equally interesting. Bank size, which should be universal, was only significant prior to
the crisis. As expected, banks with greater size were associated with survivability. What
mitigates this relationship is the federal government. Larger banks are considered too big
to fail as their failure would have far reaching ramifications in the general economy.
They cannot be considered successes because they need assistance. They cannot be
considered failures because they technically didn't fail - per the FDIC definition. They
are subsequently removed from analysis - masking any size based advantages of bank
operation.
Industry concentration was also associated with lower failure rates prior to the
financial crisis but not during it. Industry concentration is local, like the environmental
volatility. However, the negative effects of poor economic conditions supersede any
positive effects of having a highly concentrated industry. Any advantages that firm may
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achieve by being part of a consolidated industry are quickly erased when that economy
falters. By being a part of that failing economy, likelihood of failure will increase
regardless of concentration.
To conclude, risk-seeking behavior and the economic downturn were strongly tied
to this recent bank failure crisis. More banks failure occurred between 2008 and 2010
than any other period in US history except for the Great Depression and the Savings and
Loan Crisis. Managers and policy makers should take note. Risk-seeking behavior can
potentially earn greater profits during an economic expansion, but it will cause failure
when the expansion ceases.
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APPENDIX A: US BANK FAILURES; rUNE 30, 2()09 TO JUNE 29, 2010
#

Bank Name

City

State

Closing
Date

1

Founders
Bank

Worth

IL

2-Jul-09

2

First National
Bank of
Danville
Elizabeth
State Bank

Danville

IL

2-Jul-09

Elizabeth

IL

2-Jul-09

4

Rock River
Bank

Oregon

IL

2-Jul-09

5

First State
Bank of
Winchester
John Warner
Bank

Winchester

IL

2-Jul-09

Clinton

IL

2-Jul-09

Dallas

TX

2-Jul-09

Thermopolis

WY

10-Jul-09

3

6

7

8

Millennium
State Bank of
Texas
Bank of
Wyoming

9

Temecula
Valley Bank

Temecula

CA

17-Jul-09

10

Vineyard
Bank

Rancho
Cucamonga

CA

17-Jul-09

11

First
Piedmont
Bank
BankFirst

Winder

GA

17-Jul-09

Sioux Falls

SD

17-Jul-09

Gray

GA

24-Jul-09

Perry

GA

24-Jul-09

Macon

GA

24-Jul-09

Woodstock

GA

24-Jul-09

12

13

14

15

16

Security Bank
of Jones
County
Security Bank
of Houston
County
Security Bank
of Bibb
County
Security Bank
of North
Metro

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: The PrivateBank
and Trust Company - (33306)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Financial
Bank, National Association - (4382)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Galena State
Bank & Trust Co. - (19660)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: The Harvard
State Bank - (9079)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank of
Lincoln - (12396)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank of
Lincoln - (12396)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank of
Texas - (27074)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Central Bank and
Trust - (529)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens
Bank & Trust Company - (11063)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: California Bank
& Trust - (20852)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First American
Bank and Trust Company - (16858)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Alerus Financial,
National Association - (3931)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED
#

Bank Name

City

State

Closing
Date

17

Security Bank
of North Fulton

Alpharetta

GA

24-M-09

18

Security Bank
of Gwinnett
County
Waterford
Village Bank

Suwanee

GA

24-M-09

Williamsville

NY

24-Jul-09

20

Integrity Bank

Jupiter

FL

31-M-09

21

Mutual Bank

Harvey

IL

31-M-09

22

First
Bank Americano

Elizabeth

NJ

31-M-09

23

Peoples
Community
Bank
First State Bank
of Altus

West Chester

OH

31-M-09

Altus

OK

31-M-09

Community
National Bank
of Sarasota
County
First State Bank

Venice

FL

7-Aug-09

Sarasota

FL

7-Aug-09

27

Community
First Bank

Prineville

OR

7-Aug-09

28

Colonial Bank

Montgomery

AL

14-Aug-09

29

Community
Bank of
Arizona
Union Bank,
National
Association

Phoenix

AZ

14-Aug-09

Gilbert

AZ

14-Aug-09

Las Vegas

NV

14-Aug-09

19

24

25

26

30

31

Community
Bank of Nevada

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Evans Bank,
National Association - (6947)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Stonegate Bank
- (57934)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: United Central
Bank - (25330)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Crown Bank (34259)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Financial
Bank, National Association - (6600)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Herring Bank (5568)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Stearns Bank
National Association - (10988)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Stearns Bank
National Association - (10988)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Home Federal
Bank - (28258)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Branch Banking
and Trust Company - (9846)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MidFirst Bank (4063)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MidFirst Bank (4063)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Deposit
Insurance National Bank of Las Vegas
- (59002)
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED
Closing
Date

#

Bank Name

32

Dwelling
House
Savings and
Loan
Association

33

CapitalSouth
Bank

Birmingham

AL

21-Aug-09

34

First Coweta
Bank

Newnan

GA

21-Aug-09

35

ebank

Atlanta

GA

21-Aug-09

36

Guaranty
Bank

Austin

TX

21-Aug-09

37

Affinity Bank

Ventura

CA

28-Aug-09

38

Bradford
Bank

Baltimore

MD

28-Aug-09

39

Mainstreet
Bank

Forest Lake

MN

28-Aug-09

40

First State
Bank

Flagstaff

AZ

4-Sep-09

41

Vantus Bank

Sioux City

1A

4-Sep-09

42

Platinum
Community
Bank

Rolling
Meadows

IL

4-Sep-09

43

InBank

Oak Forest

IL

4-Sep-09

44

First Bank of
Kansas City

Kansas City

MO

4-Sep-09

Chicago

IL

1l-Sep-09

Woodbury

MN

1 l-Sep-09

45

46

Corns Bank,
N.A.
Brickwell
Community
Bank

City

State

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: PNC Bank,
National Association - (6384)
Pittsburgh

PA

14-Aug-09
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Iberiabank (28100)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: United Bank (172)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Stearns Bank
National Association - (10988)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Compass Bank (19048)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Pacific Western
Bank - (24045)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Manufacturers
and Traders Trust Company - (588)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Central Bank (27234)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Sunwest Bank (20164)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Great Southern
Bank - (29546)
This institution was closed due to - • - •
; Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff.
Acquiring institution:; This action did
not result in a new institution.
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MB Financial
Bank, National Association - (3628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Great American
Bank-(10908)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MB Financial
Bank, National Association - (3628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: CorTrust Bank
National Association - (6063)
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#

47

Bank Name

48

Venture Bank
Irwin Union
Bank and
Trust
Company

49

Irwin Union
Bank, F.S.B.

50

51

Georgian
Bank
Southern
Colorado
National
Bank

City

State

Closing
Date

Lacey

WA

1l-Sep-09

Columbus

IN

18-Sep-09

Louisville

KY

18-Sep-09

Atlanta

GA

25-Sep-09

Pueblo

CO

2-Oct-09

52

Warren Bank

Warren

MI

2-Oct-09

53

Jennings
State Bank

Spring Grove

MN

2-Oct-09

Bakersfield

CA

16-0ct-09

55

San Joaquin
Bank
Flagship
National
Bank

Bradenton

FL

23-Oct-09

56

Hillcrest
Bank Florida

Naples

FL

23-Oct-09

57

Partners Bank

Naples

FL

23-Oct-09

58

American
United Bank

Lawrenceville

GA

23-Oct-09

54

Westmont

IL

23-Oct-09

60

First DuPage
Bank
Riverview
Community
Bank

Otsego

MN

23-Oct-09

61

Bank of
Elmwood

Racine

WI

23-Oct-Q9

59

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens
Bank & Trust Company - (11063)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Financial
Bank, National Association - (6600)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Financial
Bank, National Association - (6600)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Citizens
Bank and Trust Company, Inc. (15504)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Legacy Bank (12699)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: The Huntington
National Bank - (6560)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Central Bank (27234)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Citizens Business
Bank - (21716)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Federal
Bank of Florida - (31313)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Stonegate Bank (57934)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Stonegate Bank (57934)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Ameris Bank (20504)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Midwest
Bank - (3709)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Central Bank (27234)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Tri City National
Bank-(18922)
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#

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

Bank Name

Bank USA,
N.A.
Pacific
National
Bank
California
National
Bank
San Diego
National
Bank
Park National
Bank
Community
Bank of
Lemont
North
Houston
Bank
Madisonville
State Bank
Citizens
National
Bank
United
Commercial
Bank
United
Security
Bank
Home
Federal
Savings Bank

76

Prosperan
Bank
Gateway
Bank of St.
Louis
Pacific Coast
National
Bank

77

Orion Bank

74

75

City

State

Closing
Date

Phoenix

AZ

30-0ct-09

San Francisco

CA

30-0ct-09

Los Angeles

CA

30-0ct-09

San Diego

CA

30-0ct-09

Chicago

IL

30-0ct-09

Lemont

IL

30-0ct-09

Houston

TX

30-0ct-09

Madisonville

TX

30-0ct-09

Teague

TX

30-0ct-09

San Francisco

CA

6-Nov-09

Sparta

GA

6-Nov-09

Detroit

MI

6-Nov-09

Oakdale

MN

6-Nov-09

St. Louis

MO

6-Nov-09

San Clemente

CA

13-Nov-09

Naples

FL

13-Nov-09

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank
National Association - (6548)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: East West Bank (31628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Ameris Bank (20504)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Liberty Bank and
Trust Company - (20856)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Alerus Financial,
National Association - (3931)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Central Bank of
Kansas City - (17009)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Sunwest Bank (20164)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Iberiabank (28100)

APPENDIX A CONTINUED
#

Bank Name

79

Century Bank,
F.S.B.
Commerce
Bank of
Southwest
Florida

80

The Tattnall
Bank

78

City

104
State

Closing
Date

Sarasota

FL

13-Nov-09

Fort Myers

FL

20-Nov-09

Reidsville

GA

4-Dec-09

Norcross

GA

4-Dec-09

82

First Security
National Bank
The Buckhead
Community
Bank

Atlanta

GA

4-Dec-09

83

Benchmark
Bank

Aurora

IL

4-Dec-09

84

AmTrust
Bank

Cleveland

OH

4-Dec-09

85

Greater
Atlantic Bank

Reston

VA

4-Dec-09

Mesa

AZ

1 l-Dec-09

Miami

FL

11-Dec-09

Overland Park

KS

1 l-Dec-09

Irondale

AL

18-Dec-09

Santa Monica

CA

18-Dec-09

81

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

Valley Capital
Bank, N.A.
Republic
Federal Bank,
N.A.

SolutionsBank
New South
Federal
Savings Bank
First Federal
Bank of
California,
F.S.B.
Imperial
Capital Bank
Peoples First
Community
Bank

La Jolla

CA

18-Dec-09

Panama City

FL

18-Dec-09

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Iberiabank (28100)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Central Bank (27234)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Heritage Bank of
the South - (50028)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: State Bank and
Trust Company - (57870)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MB Financial
Bank, National Association - (3628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: New York
Community Bank - (16022)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: SONABANK (57968)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Enterprise Bank
& Trust - (27237)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: 1st United Bank (35408)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Arvest Bank (8728)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Beal Bank, SSB (32574)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: OneWest Bank,
FSB - (58978)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: City National
Bank-(17281)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Hancock Bank (12441)
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Bank Name

93

RockBridge
Commercial
Bank

Atlanta

GA

18-Dec-09

94

Independent
Bankers'
Bank

Springfield

IL

18-Dec-09

95

Citizens State
Bank

New Baltimore

MI

18-Dec-09

96

City

State

Closing
Date

#

Bellingham

WA

8-Jan-10

97

Horizon Bank
Town
Community
Bank & Trust

Antioch

IL

15-Jan-10

98

St. Stephen
State Bank

St. Stephen

MN

15-Jan-10

99

Barnes
Banking
Company

Kaysville

UT

15-Jan-10

100

Premier
American
Bank

Miami

FL

22-Jan-10

101

Bank of
Leeton

Leeton

MO

22-Jan-10

102

Charter Bank

Santa Fe

NM

22-Jan-10

103

Columbia
River Bank

The Dalles

OR

22-Jan-10

104

Evergreen
Bank

Seattle

WA

22-Jan-10

105

First Regional
Bank

Los Angeles

CA

29-Jan-10

106

Florida
Community
Bank

Immokalee

FL

29-Jan-10

Outcome of Failed Bank

This institution was closed due to
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff.
Acquiring institution: This action did
not result in a new institution.
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Independent
Bankers' Bank Bridge Bank, National
Association - (59021)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Deposit
Insurance National Bank of New
Baltimore - (59022)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Washington
Federal - (28088)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First American
Bank - (3657)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Sentry Bank (8546)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Deposit
Insurance National Bank of Kaysville (59027)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Florida
Community Bank, National Association
-(58991)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Sunflower Bank,
National Association - (4767)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Charter Bank (59030)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Columbia State
Bank - (33826)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Umpqua Bank (17266)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens
Bank & Trust Company - (11063)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Florida
Community Bank, National Association
- (58991)
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#

Bank Name

108

Community
Bank and
Trust
First National
Bank of
Georgia

109

Marshall
Bank, N.A.

107

110

111

112

113

114

115

American
Marine Bank
1st American
State Bank of
Minnesota
La Jolla
Bank, FSB
George
Washington
Savings Bank
The La Coste
National
Bank
Marco
Community
Bank

City

State

Closing
Date

Cornelia

GA

29-Jan-10

Carrollton

GA

29-Jan-10

Hallock

MN

29-Jan-10

Bainbridge
Island

WA

29-Jan-10

Hancock

MN

5-Feb-10

La Jolla

CA

19-Feb-10

Orland Park

1L

19-Feb-10

La Coste

TX

19-Feb-10

Marco Island

FL

19-Feb-10

Tacoma

WA

26-Feb-10

Carson City

NV

26-Feb-10

117

Rainier
Pacific Bank
Carson River
Community
Bank

118

Centennial
Bank

Ogden

UT

5-Mar-10

119

Waterfield
Bank

German town

MD

5-Mar-10

120

Bank of
Illinois

Normal

IL

5-Mar-10

121

Sun American
Bank

Boca Raton

FL

5-Mar-10

122

LibertyPointe
Bank

New York

NY

11-Mar-10

116

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: SCBT National
Association - (13425)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Community &
Southern Bank - (59010)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Community &
Southern Bank - (59010)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: United Valley
Bank-(15478)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Community
Development Bank, FSB - (10568)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: OneWest Bank,
FSB - (58978)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Firstmerit Bank,
National Association - (13675)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Community
National Bank - (23431)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Mutual of Omaha
Bank - (32325)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Umpqua Bank (17266)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Heritage Bank of
Nevada - (34072)
This institution was closed due to"-. V
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff.
Acquiring institution:. This action did
not result in a new institution. Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Waterfield Bank,
FA - (59036)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Heartland Bank
and Trust Company - (20369)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens
Bank & Trust Company - (11063)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Valley National
Bank - (9396)
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#

Bank Name

City

State

Closing
Date

123

Statewide
Bank

Covington

LA

12-Mar-10

124

Old Southern
Bank

Orlando

FL

12-Mar-10

125

The Park
Avenue Bank

New York

NY

12-Mar-10

126

State Bank of
Aurora

Aurora

MN

19-Mar-10

127

First Lowndes
Bank

Fort Deposit

AL

19-Mar-10

Hiawassee

GA

19-Mar-10

Ellijay

GA

19-Mar-10

Draper

UT

19-Mar-10

Duluth

GA

19-Mar-10

Parma

OH

19-Mar-10

Phoenix

AZ

26-Mar-10

Cartersville

GA

26-Mar-10

Key West

FL

26-Mar-10

Carrollton

GA

26-Mar-10

Myrtle Beach

SC

9-Apr-10

129

Bank of
Hiawassee
Appalachian
Community
Bank

130

Advanta Bank
Corp.

128

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

Century
Security Bank
American
National
Bank
Desert Hills
Bank
Unity
National
Bank
Key West
Bank
Mcintosh
Commercial
Bank
Beach First
National
Bank

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Home Bank (28094)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Centennial Bank
-(11241)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Valley National
Bank - (9396)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Northern State
Bank-(15242)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Citizens
Bank-(23152)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Citizens South
Bank - (28833)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Community &
Southern Bank - (59010)
This institution was closed due to
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff.
Acquiring institution: This action did
not result in a new institution.
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Bank of Upson (17041)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: The National
Bank and Trust Company - (6731)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: New York
Community Bank - (16022)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Bank of the
Ozarks - (110)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Centennial Bank
-(11241)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: CharterBank (30720)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Bank of North
Carolina - (33527)
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Bank Name

City

State

Closing
Date

138

City Bank

Lynnwood

WA

16-Apr-10

139

Tamalpais
Bank

San Rafael

CA

16-Apr-10

140

Innovative
Bank

Oakland

CA

16-Apr-10

Lowell

MA

16-Apr-10

Fort Pierce

FL

16-Apr-10

141

142

Butler Bank
Riverside
National
Bank of
Florida

144

AmericanFirst
Bank
First Federal
Bank of North
Florida

145

Lakeside
Community
Bank

143

147

Wheatland
Bank
Peotone Bank
and Trust
Company

148

Lincoln Park
Savings Bank

146

Clermont

FL

16-Apr-10

Palatka

FL

16-Apr-10

Sterling Heights

MI

16-Apr-10

Naperville

IL

23-Apr-10

Peotone

IL

23-Apr-10

Chicago

IL

2 3-Apr-10

Chicago

IL

23-Apr-10

Chicago

IL

23-Apr-10

150

New Century
Bank
Citizens Bank
and Trust
Company of
Chicago

151

Broadway
Bank

Chicago

IL

23-Apr-10

152

Amcore
Bank, NA

Rockford

IL

23-Apr-10

153

Frontier Bank

Everett

WA

30-Apr-10

149

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Whidbey Island
Bank-(18412)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Union Bank,
National Association - (22826)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: BBCN Bank (26610)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: People's United
Bank - (27334)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: TD Bank,
National Association - (18409)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: TD Bank,
National Association - (18409)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: TD Bank,
National Association - (18409)
This institution was closed due to
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff.
Acquiring institution: This action did
not result in a new institution.
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Wheaton Bank &
Trust - (33803)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Midwest
Bank - (3709)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Northbrook Bank
and Trust Company - (57082)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MB Financial
Bank, National Association - (3628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Republic Bank of
Chicago - (19333)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: MB Financial
Bank, National Association - (3628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: BMO Harris
Bank National Association - (16571)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Union Bank,
National Association - (22826)
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#

Bank Name

154

BC National
Banks

Butler

MO

30-Apr-10

155

Champion
Bank

Creve Coeur

MO

30-Apr-10

156

CF Bancorp

Port Huron

MI

30-Apr-10

Mayaguez

PR

30-Apr-10

Hato Rey

PR

30-Apr-10

157

158

159

Westernbank
Puerto Rico
R-G Premier
Bank of
Puerto Rico

City

State

San Juan

PR

30-Apr-10

160

Eurobank
1st Pacific
Bank of
California

San Diego

CA

7-May-10

161

Towne Bank
of Arizona

Mesa

AZ

7-May-10

162

Access Bank

Champlin

MN

7-May-10

Bonifay

FL

7-May-10

Elmwood Park

IL

14-May-10

163

164

165

The Bank of
Bonifay
Midwest
Bank and
Trust
Company
Southwest
Community
Bank

Springfield

MO

14-May-10

Plymouth

MI

14-May-10

167

New Liberty
Bank
Satilla
Community
Bank

Saint Mary's

GA

14-May-10

168

Pinehurst
Bank

Saint Paul

MN

21-May-10

Las Vegas

NV

28-May-10

Granite Bay

CA

28-May-10

166

169

170

Sun West
Bank
Granite
Community
Bank, NA

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Community First
Bank-(10595)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: BankLiberty. (30817)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Talmer Bank and
Trust - (58132)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico - (34968)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Scotiabank de
Puerto Rico - (22946)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Oriental Bank
and Trust - (31469)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: City National
Bank-(17281)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Commerce Bank
of Arizona - (57279)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: PrinsBank (10191)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First Federal
Bank of Florida - (31313)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Firstmerit Bank,
National Association - (13675)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Simmons First
National Bank - (3890)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Bank of Ann
Arbor - (34120)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Ameris Bank (20504)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Coulee Bank (18361)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: City National
Bank - (17281)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Tri Counties
Bank-(21943)
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Bank Name

City

State

Closing
Date

173

Bank of
Florida Tampa
Bank of
Florida Southwest
Bank of
Florida Southeast

174

TierOne
Bank

Lincoln

NE

4-Jun-10

175

Areola
Homestead
Savings Bank

Areola

IL

4-Jun-10

Rosedale

MS

4-Jun-10

Seattle

WA

ll-Jun-10

171

172

178

First National
Bank
Washington
First
International
Bank
Nevada
Security
Bank

179

176

177

Tampa

FL

28-May-10

Naples

FL

28-May-10

Fort Lauderdale

FL

28-May-10

Reno

NV

18-Jun-10

First National
Bank

Savannah

GA

25-Jun-10

180

Peninsula
Bank

Englewood

FL

25-Jun-10

181

High Desert
State Bank

Albuquerque

NM

25-Jun-10

Outcome of Failed Bank

Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: EverBank (34775)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: EverBank (34775)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: EverBank (34775)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Great Western
Bank-(15289)
This institution was closed due to
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff.
Acquiring institution: This action did
not result in a new institution.
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: The Jefferson
Bank - (11445)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: East West Bank (31628)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: Umpqua Bank (17266)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First American
Bank - (2240)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: The Savannah
Bank, National Association - (33120)
Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: First American
Bank - (2240)

APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS
FDIC-Insured Institutions: The category of FDIC-insured commercial banks includes
all commercial banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It
also includes all commercial banks insured by the FDIC that are regulated by and submit
financial data to one of the three Federal commercial bank regulators (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). The category of FDIC-insured savings
institutions includes all institutions insured by the FDIC that operated under state or
federal banking codes applicable to thrift institutions.
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